TARKKA-AMPUJAKILTA

Lainaus käyttäjältä: MSa
Nimimerkillä: edelleenin hävettää ne Överummin-kyntöaurat, joiden runkoon on tullut ammuttua reikä 300m päästä 308W Trainer paukulla...

Lainaus käyttäjältä: JL
Irtosiko auran omistajalta mitään terminaaliballistisesti valaisevaa  kommenttia???



 :lol:  :lol:

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SOPaljonkohan tarvitsisi laittaa suojalevyyn paksuutta tuota kaatuvaa maalilaitetta ajatellen? Materiaali taitaa olla ihan "viiskakkosta" rautaa mitä hyllyssä on.

10mm, 20mm ?

 :wink:

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SOPaljonkohan tarvitsisi laittaa suojalevyyn paksuutta tuota kaatuvaa maalilaitetta ajatellen? :wink:

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SO
Näköjään tuo about 15mm on nyrkkisääntö FMJ .308lle :)

Aika merkittävä ero .223lla (6mm) ja 7,62x51 natolla (14,5mm).

Lainaus käyttäjältä: JL

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SO
Näköjään tuo about 15mm on nyrkkisääntö FMJ .308lle :)

Aika merkittävä ero .223lla (6mm) ja 7,62x51 natolla (14,5mm).

Ja kuinka paksu panssarointi on PaSissa?

6-12mm....ei kivaa olla kyydissä kun kiväärillä ammuskellaan kohti.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SO
Viitaten toisella palstalla (Häyhä-Kisat) käytävään keskusteluun:

:arrow:

Riippuu vähän mitä sillä kiväärillä nyt sitten tarkoitetaan.

 :lol:

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SO
Sehän on panssaroitumiehistönkuljetusvaunu eikä panssariajoneuvo

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SO
Huomioi että hankalaa on pasiinkin ampua niin että luoti osuu 90 asteen kulmassa.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: espoVeikkaan että ovenkahvan akseliin.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: mpmasaTaitaa tuo 14.5 milliä olla 7.62x51 AP luodille.

Jo 7.62x39 api näkyisi menevän 13mm

Armoksiin normaali nato ball 6mm levy näkyisi riittävän.





hardoksia tai ruukin ar:ää luokkaa 10mm tai kulmaan asetettuna ohempaa normaali suojaus sydeemeihin niin kyl se siitä...



300WSM 9.7lb v3=1000m/s matka 100m 6mm hardox 400 läpi niin että heilahti.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: JL
Tosiaan, nyt vasta katselin tarkemmin taulukkoa. Amet 10m/osumalta suojaavan teräslevyn paksuus:



5.56x45, SS109 FMJ 4g luoti 950m/s = 6mm

7.62x51, Nato 9.5g FMJ luoti 830m/s = 6mm

7.62x39, 8g FMJ 720m/s = 4mm

7.62x51 Nato 9.5g FMJ 800m/s = 5.5mm

7.62x51 Nato AP 9.8g 820m/s = 14.5mm

7.62x39 AP 7.65g, 740m/s = 13mm

5.56x45 Ball SS92/M193 3.65g FMJ 970m/s = 10mm



Merkillepantavaa on se, että yllättäen "hernepyssy" 223Rem:iltä suojautumiseen tarvitaankin enemmän ainevahvuutta.  :shock: mitämitä? Eihän sen nyt näin pitänyt mennä...  :lol:  :wink:

Nopealle standardi Nato-3.6g FMJ luodille 10mm vs. 308 Nato-9.5g FMJ 6mm.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: mpmasatuossa saattaisi olla virhe m193:nenhan on tunnettu sirpaloitumistaipumuksestaan(muisti pettää?) jolloin ei ole ehkä noin paljon läpäisyä verrattuna ss109.



tuo voisi olla ap:n tulos kun kerran hb300 12mm @100m niin hb500 10mm @10m. Näyttäisi järkevältä.

Lainaa 7.62 mm Versus 5.56 mm - Does NATO

Really Need Two Standard Rifle Calibers

CSC 1986

SUBJECT AREA General

TITLE:  7.62 mm Versus 5.56 mm - Does NATO Really Need Two

Standard Rifle Calibers?

I.    Purpose: To reestablish the 7.62mm NATO cartridge as the

optimum rifle caliber ammunition for the U. S. and NATO.

II.   Problem:  NATO recently adopted the 5.56mm as its second

standard rifle caliber cartridge.  As a result, the existing NATO

standard, the 7.62mm, has been relegated to a secondary

supporting role within NATO's armed forces.  Although the

selection of the 5.56mm was based on extensive testing, research,

and documented battle performance, this intermediate power round

is not the optimum ammunition and caliber for U. S. and NATO

forces in the contemplated battlefields of the future.

III.  Discussion:  Proponents of the intermediate power 5.56mm

have continuously compared their smaller cartridge to the large

full power 7.62mm.  The results of these comparisons purportedly

show the superiority of the smaller ammunition in the areas of

penetration, lethality, weapon portability, and fire power.

Careful examinaton of these tests and the touted advantages of

the 5.56mm, however, shows that the 7.62mm is still potentially

superior to the smaller round.  For example, in the NATO tests,

researchers have compared a modern, semi-armor piercing round of

ammunition (5.56mm) against a standard ball cartidge

(7.62mm) that has not been improved since its adoption in 1953.

An improved 7.62mm NATO, using the same technology as the

5.56mm, would definitely out-perform the smaller cartridge.  With

respect to portability, second generation 7.62mm rifles are

smaller, more compact, and very comparable to certain 5.56mm

weapons.  Concerning fire power, any full automatic fire with

light assault rifles, even with the low-recoil 5.56mm, is not

effective and only results in a waste of ammunition.  In

addition, new tecnological developments in body armor may soon

defeat the penetration capability of the small 5.56mm.  New

developments in optical sighting equipment will soon increase

battlefield engagement ranges and thereby exceed the long range

accuracy capability of the smaller 5.56mm.  The large case and

projectile of the 7.62mm, however, are more than sufficient to

accept significant improvements in penetration, lethality, and

long range performance.  This will allow the 7.62mm to remain

effective on futrure battlefields.

IV.   Conclusion:  The 5.56mm will, at best, only be an interim

NATO standard.  Due to its small size, further improvements of

the 5.56mm will be insufficient to keep up with the changing

requirements of future battlefields.  Overall, the older 7.62mm

NATO is a better standard cartridge since it has the capacity and

the flexibility to be significantly improved and thereby remain

effective.

V.    Recommendations:  The 7.62mm NATO cartridge should be

developed with current technology to improve its penetration,

lethality, and overall-performance.  Modern weapons systems

should be further developed to utilize the 7.62mm.  No, NATO does

not need two standard rifle calibers.

Major Vern T. Miyagi                  



Conference Group 6

            RESEARCH PAPER

             Title

7.62mm Versus 5.56mm - Does NATO Really Need Two Standard Rifle

Calibers?

            Thesis Statement

    Although the selection of the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge was

based on extensive testing, research, and documented battle

performance, this intermediate power round is not the optimum

ammunition and caliber for U. S. and NATO forces in the

contemplated battlefields of the future.

  I.   Significance of the Controversy

       A. Thesis statement

       B. Method of analysis

  II.  Evolution of the Intermediate Power Cartridge Concept

       A. Germany

       B. Soviet Union

       C. United States

 III.  Development of the Two Standard NATO Cartidges

       A. 7.62 x 51mm NATO

       B. 5.56 x 45mm NATO

       C. NATO trials

       D. Concepts of employment - NATO

  IV.  Comparison of the 7.62mm With the 5.56mm

       A. Physical characteristics and ballistics

       B. Penetration

       C. Portability and weight

       D. Firepower

   V.  Analysis

       A. Problems with the NATO comparisons and tests

       B. Factors not considered in the NATO tests

       C. Effects of technological advances in optical sights and

body armor on the initial imtermediate power concepts

       D. Potential for improvement and development - 5.56mm v.

7.62mm

       E. Lethality of improved round is reduced

       F. Potenial ineffectiveness on NATO scenario battlefields

7.62 mm Versus 5.56 mm - Does NATO Really Need Two Standard Rifle

Calibers?

    On 28 October 1980, after more than four years of extensive

testing at the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Federal

Republic of Germany, the NATO Small Arms Test Control Commission

(NSMATCC) appoved the standardization of a second rifle caliber

cartridge.  The cartidge selected was the intermediate power

5.56 x 45mm (.223 Caliber) and the improved Belgian version, the

SS109, was selected as the basis for standardization.1  As a

result, NATO now has two standard rifle caliber cartridges, the

full power 7.62 x 51mm NATO (.308 Caliber), in service since

1953, and the new intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm NATO adopted in

1980.  Although the selection of the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge was

based on extensive testing, research, and documented battle per-

formance, this intermediate power round is not the optimum ammu-

nition and caliber for U. S. and NATO forces in the contemplated

battlefields of the future.  Let's examine the concept of inter-

mediate power rifle ammunition, the evolution of the two standard

NATO rifle cartridges, their advantages and disadvantages, and

discuss why the older, full power 7.62 x 51mm NATO cartridge can

better satisfy the present and future tactical needs of the

individual NATO rifleman.

    The concept of intermediate power rifle cartridges began in

Germany prior to World War II.  The standard German rifle car-

tridge used since 1888 was the full power 7.92 x 57mm which

propelled a 198 grain bullet at a muzzle velocity of 2,550 feet

per second (fps) or 773 meters per second (mps).  Comprehensive

studies of the actual distances over which rifle fire was em-

ployed and of the marksmanship capabilities of the average German

infantryman, especially during the heat of battle, convinced

German researchers that a smaller, substantially less-powerful,

and lighter cartridge would be more than adequate.  In addition,

the adoption of smaller intermediate power cartridges would allow

the development of shorter and lighter rifles, the ability to

carry more rounds of ammunition, and the enhancement of accuracy

due to lighter recoil.  German research for a new intermediate

round commenced in 1934, and in 1938 a new intermediate cartridge

was adopted and designated the 7.9 mm Infanterie Kurz Patrone

(7.9 mm Kurz).  This cartridge propelled a small 125 grain bullet

at a relatively moderate muzzle velocity of 2,100 fps (636 mps),

Paralleling the evolution of the 7.9 mm Kurz was the development

of a new, compact, select-fire rifle chambered for the new ammu-

nition.  In 1940, two designs were accepted for field testing and

were extensively used on the Russian front.  The final version

"Sturmgewehr" or assault rifle, the MP43, was adopted in 1943 and

significant numbers were produced prior to the end of the war.

This weapon utilized a thirty round magazine and could provide

both semiautomatic and full automatic fire.  Althought the MP43,

with a fully loaded thiry round magazine, was more than three

pounds heavier than the standard bolt-action Kar 98k rifle, the

new weapon's performance in the field was excellent due to the

terrific firepower now available to the German infantryman.2

    The effectiveness of the new rifle and ammunition did not go

unnoticed by Soviet forces, especially since they were the  first

recipients of its firepower.  Captured rifles and ammunition were

carefully studied, and in 1943 an intermediate power cartridge

designed by Soviet engineers, N. M. Elizarov and B. V. Semin, was

adopted by the Soviet Union.  This cartridge was designated the

7.62 x 39mm Model 1943 and consisted of a 125 grain bullet with a

muzzle velocity of 2,200 fps (667 mps).  Due to wartime materiel

and production shortages, the first weapon designed to use this

new ammunition, the SKS Carbine, was not adopted until 1946.  One

year later, the famous AK-47, designed by M. Kalashnikov, was

formally adopted by the Soviet armed forces.3  In 1974, a product

improved version of the same basic design, the AKS74 rifle, was

adopted by the Soviet army.  The AKS74 is chambered for a new 5.45

x 39mm (.221 Caliber) cartridge, very similar to our own 5.56 x

45mm NATO.  The Soviets also adopted, at the same time, a new

5.45mm squad automatic weapon, called RPK74.4  These recent

changes in Soviet small arms development are very important

because they closely parallel the small arms concepts of the

U. S. and NATO.

    Like the Germans and Soviets, the U. S. also experimented

with intermediate power cartridges during World War II.  Designed

as a replacement for the pistol and submachine gun during World

War II, the U. S. .30 Caliber M1 and M2 carbines fires lighter

and smaller .30 caliber cartridges (7.62 x 33mm).  This cartridge

propelled a small round-nosed 115 grain bullet at an initial

velocity of 1,970 fps (597 mps).  The carbine and its cartridge,

however, were designed for issue only to officers, non-commis-

sioned officers, service troops, and members of heavy weapons

crews.  The carbine, with its intermediate power cartridge, was

never designed to replace the M1 Garand and its full power .30

Caliber M2 (30-06) ammuntion.  Over six million carbines were

produced during World War II and the Korean War.  Although the

carbines were light, compact, had a select fire capability (M2

model), and utilized magazines with capacities of thiry or

fifteen rounds, these weapons eventually came to be unpopular

with U. S. troops due to the limited range and inadequate stop-

ping power of the carbine ammunition.  Soon after the Korean War,

the U. S. M1 and M2 Carbines were retired from service.5

    Such was the evolution of the intermediate power cartridge

concepts in Germany, the Soveit Union, and the United States

during the 1940's.  Lets now take a look at the development of

the 7.62 x 51mm NATO and the 5.56 x 45mm NATO during the 1950's

and 1960's

    The first standard NATO cartridge, the 7.62 x 51mm NATO, was

developed by the United States as a successor to the .30 Caliber

M2 round (30-06), which had served as the standard U. S. rifle

cartridge since 1906.  The .30 Caliber M2 cartridge propelled a

150 grain projectile at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (848 mps)

and served the U. S. very effectively in the 1903  Springfield and

M1 Garand service rifles, the Browning automatic rifle, and the

heavy and light models of the Browning machine guns.  Although

the M1 Garand was very effective and highly praised during its

service as the standard U. S. rifle in World War II and Korea,

many infantrymen desired a lighter weapon with greater ammunition

capacity and a select-fire capability.6  Many soldiers attemped

to use the M2 carbine as a replacement for the M1 Garand, but

this proved unsatisfactory due to the inadequate power of the

carbine ammuniton.  In September 1945, after conducting prelimi-

nary tests to improve the M1 rifle, the U. S. Ordnance Technical

Committee turned its attention to the development of a new and

lighter rifle cartridge that would replace the .30 Caliber M2

round.  This interest in a new cartridge was influenced by the

battlefield success of the German 7.9mm Kurz, and Soviet adop-

tion of their Kalashnikov light assault rifles using the new 7.62

x 39mm Model 43 intermediate power ammunition.  As the develop-

ment of the new U. S. service rifle cartidge progressed, however,

traditionalism took hold as U. S. Army participants began to feel

that the intermediate power ammuniton, used by the Soviets and

the Germans, were too limited in their effective combat ranges

and power to satisfy U. S. infantry requirements.  The result was

a compromise.  The Ordnance Technical Committee came up with a

shortened version of the old .30 caliber M2 cartidge.  This new

cartridge, designated the 7.62 x 51mm T65, was not an inter-

mediate power round.  Although shorter by a half inch than the old

Caliber .30 M2 round, it still propelled a 147 grain bullet at a

muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (848 mps) -- essentially identical

to the old .30 Caliber M2 round.  Newly developed ball powder

allowed the use of smaller cartridge case to produce pressures

and velocities identical to the old full power .30 Caliber M2

round.7

    Final U. S. adoption of the new 7.62 x 51mm T65 cartridge

depended upon the acceptance of the new round by members of the

NATO alliance. During the early 1950's, the British conducted

their own tests to determine the optimum rifle ammunition for

their troops.  They concluded that a .280 Caliber (7 mm)

cartridge was the ideal rifle caliber.  The proposed British

cartridge was a true intermediate power cartridge based on German

experience and Soviet developments.  In 1953, after much

political debate, the U. S. 7.62 x 51mm T65 round was finally

adopted by the NATO Alliance as its standard rifle caliber

cartidge.  In 1957, after numerous trails, the U. S. finally

adopted the M14 rifle as its new standard 7.62mm NATO caliber

service rifle.  The other members of NATO adopted either the

German G3 or the Belgian FN FAL as their standard 7.62mm NATO

caliber service rifles.8

    The 5.56 x 45mm cartridge and the M16 rifle was originally

developed and unilaterally adopted by the United States in 1963

for initial employment in Southeast Asia.  A resurgence of U. S.

interest in intermediate power rifle cartridges developed soon

after the 7.62 x 51mm NATO was adopted in 1953.  A series of

tests, commissioned by the U. S. Army and conducted by the Opera-

tions Research Organization (ORO), concluded that the rifle was

seldom used effectively by U. S. troops at ranges in excess of

300 meters (330 yds).  This conclusion was based on studies of

actual battles involving U. S. soldiers.  According to the ORO

studies, the inability of U. S. soldiers to effectively engage

targets beyond 300 meters was due to their inability, under

battle conditions, to see and identify targets beyond that

range.9  The ORO studies, however, failed to consider whether the

enemy targets were behind heavy brush, or barriers such as

sandbags, dirt berms, and coconut logs when fired on by U. S.

soldiers.  The study assumed that there was nothing between the

firer and the target to impede the flight of the rifle projec-

tile.  Concurrently, ballistic experiments, conducted as part of

the U. S. Army Project Caliber, demonstrated the small high

velocity bullets, ranging in caliber from .222 to .257 inches and

weighing only 40 to 55 grains, were very effective at ranges up

to 400 meters.10  As a result of these studies, the Continental

Army Command (CONARC) asked selected commercial arms organiza-

tions to develop high velocity .223 Cal (5.56mm) ammunition and

light weight assault rifles chambered for them.  After extensive

testing of candidate weapons and ammunition submitted by various

manufacturers, CONARC selected the AR15 rifle and the 5.56 x 45mm

ammunition, both developed by Eugene Stoner of the Armalite

Division of the Fairchild Aircraft Engine Corporation.  The 5.56

x 45mm cartidge was derived from the .222 Remington and .22

Hornet commercial cartridges used by small game hunters

throughout the United States.  After some modifications for mili-

tary use, the AR15 and its 5.56 x 45mm, cartridge were accepted by

CONARC and designated as the M16 and the M193, respectively.11

The M193 cartridge, as finally accepted by CONARC, propelled a

small 55 grain bullet at an inital velocity of 3,180 fps (964

mps) through the standard 20 inch barrel of the M16.  Test

weapons and ammunition were sent to Southeast Asia in 1962 for

combat field analysis.  The reports from both U. S. and allied

forces were very good and consequently, in 1963, Secretary of

Defense McNamara ordered the cessation of M14 production and

announced the purchase of 85,000 M16 rifles for the Army and

19,000 for the Air Force.  Subsequent performance of the M16 in

Vietnam was marred by frequent jamming caused by improper and

insufficient maintenance in the field.  Performance quickly im-

proved as chrome barrels and chambers were used in the newer

M16A1 model, and proper maintenance procedures were employed by

troops in the field.  The U. S. finally had adopted an inter-

mediate power fifle cartridge and a true light-weight assault

weapon to use it.12

    The adoption of the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge and the M16 rifle

put the U. S. into the situation of having two standard service

rifles.  The initial U. S. Army employment concept called for the

issue of the M16 to special operations and airborne troops, and

to troops in Southeast Asia.  The M14 would still be issued to

troops stationed in Europe of assigned to NATO.13  This initial

concept proved to be logistically impractical and, eventually,

all U. S. troops were issued the new M16 rifle and 5.56 x 45mm

ammunition.

    Based on the overall success of the 5.56mm ammunition in

Southeast Asia, after the initial problems with the M16 were

solved, other nations began to produce assault type rifles using

the U. S. 5.56 x 45mm ammunition.  In order to standardize the

use and procurement of 5.56mm ammunition among member nations,

NATO commenced formal adoption trials for a second small rifle

caliber cartridge in 1976. The Belgian product-improved version

of the U. S. M193 5.56 x 45mm cartridge was adopted by the

alliance in 1980.

    The current NATO concept of employment calls for the issue

of the 5.56mm weapons to individual riflemen, members of crew-

served weapon teams, support troops, and officers and NCO's.  The

current NATO concept also includes the development and adoption

of a squad automatic weapon (SAW) in 5.56 x 45mm NATO caliber.

The goal of NATO small arms employment is to ensure ammunition

interchangeability at the basic infantry squad level.  The full

power 7.62 x 51mm NATO remains the standard ammunition for the

heavier belt-fed medium machine guns (M60, MG3, and FN MAG)

employed with infantry weapons squads, weapons platoons, and as

vehicle mounted support weapons.14  In addition, specialized

sniper weapons still employ the longer ranged 7.62 x 51mm NATO.

     The foregoing paragraphs reviewed the evolution of the

intermediate  power cartridge concept, documented the development

of the two standard NATO cartidges, and discussed the current

concept of employment within the NATO alliance.  Let's now compare

the two cartidges, examine their strengths and weaknesses, and

analyze why the 7.62 x 51mm NATO is a better rifle cartridge in

the long run for the U. S. and NATO (Table I).

     The current production 7.62 x 51mm NATO ball cartridge has

remained unchanged since its adoption by NATO in 1953.  As typi-

fied by the U. S. M80 ball and the Belgian M77 ball, this

cartridge propels a 147-grain cupronickel-jacketed lead bullet

at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (848 mps).  Total cartridge

length and weight are 2.80 inches and 386 grains, respectively.15

Utilizing a standard 22-inch barrel with a rifling twist of one

turn in twelve inches (M14 rifle), the maximum effective range of

the 7.62 x 51mm ball cartridge is listed as 620 meters (682

yds).  The U. S. M80 and the Belgian M77 ball projectiles can

penetrate the standard NATO 3.45 mm (.14 inch) thick steel plate

up to a range of 620 meters, and can penetrate one side of the

U. S. steel helmet up to a range of 800 meters (880 yds).16  In

barrier and fortification penetration tests, the 147 grain ball

projectile can consistently penetrate two test building blocks.17

     The SS109 5.56mm NATO cartridge is a second generation

intermediate power round developed with 1970's technology.  It is

significantly more powerful and effective than the U. S. M193

5.56mm ball round originally used with the M16 rifle.  The new

SS109 cartridge propels a heavier 62-grain semi-armor piercing

projectile at an initial velocity of 3,050 fps (924 mps).18  The

improved projectile contains a 10-grain .182 caliber hardened

steel penetrator that ensures penetration at longer ranges.

Total cartridge length and weight are 2.26 inches and 182.0

grains, respectively.  The increased length and weight of the new

SS109 projectile requires a faster rifling twist of one turn in

seven inches to fully stabilize the new projectile in

flight.19  The predecessor M193 5.56mm, which used a projectile

weighting only 55 grains, was only marginally stabilized with a

slower rifling twist of one turn in twelve inches.  The new

projectile can penetrate the standard NATO 3.45mm steel plate up

to a range of 640 meters (704 yds) and one side of the U. S.

steel helmet up to a range of 1,300 meters (1430 yds).20  In tests

of barrier and fortification penetration however, the steel

penetrator of the SS109 could not pierce any of the test building

blocks.21

     The primary advantages of the intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm

NATO cartidge are summarized as follows: (1) the penetration and

power of the SS109 version are superior to the 7.62mm NATO and

more than adequate for the 300-meter average combat range

documented in actual battle (ORO studies): (2) the lower recoil

generated by the 5.56mm cartridge allows more control during full

automatic fire and therefore provides greater firepower to the

individual soldier; (3) the lesser weight of the 5.56mm

ammunition allows the individual soldier to carry more ammunition

and other equipment; (4) the smaller size of the 5.56mm

ammunition allows the use of smaller, lighter, and more compact

rifles and squad automatic weapons and; (5) the lethality of the

5.56mm projectile is greater than the 7.62mm projectile at normal

combat ranges, due to the tendency of the lighter projectile to

tumble or shatter on impact.  In summary, the 5.56mm NATO

provides greater firepower and effectiveness than the larger and

heavier 7.62mm NATO.  This concept of more for less appears very

convincing, however upon careful analysis, this idea loses its

credibility.  Let's examine each of the advantages of the 5.56mm

NATO, compare them to the qualities of the larger 7.62mm NATO,

and discuss some critical factors not addressed by proponents of

the smaller cartridge.

     The penetration results obtained by the  NSMATCC with the

5.56mm SS109 cartridge are impressive.  The SS109 can penetrate

the 3.45mm standard NATO steel plate to 640 meters, while the

7.62mm ball can only penetrate it to 620 meters.  The U. S. steel

helmet penetration results are even more impressive as the SS109

can penetrate it up to 1,300 meters, while the 7.62mm ball cannot

penetrate it beyond 800 meters.  These comparisons however, do

not consider the fact that the SS109 uses a semi-armor piercing,

steel-cored projectile, while the 7.62mm ball uses a relatively

soft anti-personnel, lead-cored projectile.  A semi-armor

piercing 7.62mm caliber projectile, using second generation

technology as the SS109, would easily out-perform the smaller

SS109 projectile in penetration tests at all ranges.22  With

respect to barrier and fortification penetration tests, the

7.62mm ball projectile can consistently penetrate two test

building blocks, while the SS109 semi-armor piercing projectile

cannot penetrate a single block.  In light of these

considerations, the idea of SS109 penetration superiority over

the 7.62 x 51mm is not valid.

    The concept that greater firepower can be achieved by provi-

ding as much infantrymen with a full automatic fire capability is

not realistic.  Battle experience has shown that full automatic

fire from light assault rifles is largely ineffective and only

resutls in the expenditure of large quantities of ammunition.

Even with the lower recoil generated by 5.56mm ammunition, auto-

matic fire dispersion is still too large to be effective.23  Fire

power is normally equated with maximum "steel" on target, not with

maximum steel in the general direction of the target.  Full

automatic fire with the 5.56mm NATO just as wasteful and

Confirming this view is the fact that second generation assault

rifles, such as the U. S. M16A2 and Belgian FN FNC, are not

employing a 3-shot burst control in lieu of a full automatic

capability.24  With this burst control feature, a thirty round

magazine produces only ten bursts.  Do we need thirty rounds to

successfully hit and incapacitate ten enemy targets?  Even with

3-shot burst control and the lower impulse of the 5.56mm

ammunition, shot dispersion is still too large to be effective.

Perhaps a single well-aimed 147 grain 7.62mm bullet would have

more effect than three rounds of 5.56mm fired in the burst

control mode.  As a result, the lower recoil and impulse of the

5.56mm ammuntion does not provide greater fire power since full

automatic fire from an individual assault rifle is largely

ineffective and only wastes ammunition.

     A great deal of emphasis has been placed, during the

development of intermediate power ammunition, on ammunition

weight.  It is a fact that 5.56-mm NATO ammunition weight only

47% as much as 7.62 mm NATO ammunition.  This weight reduction

advantage however, comes with a corresponding disadvantage in the

power and effectiveness of the ammuntion.  The 5.56mm NATO

cartridge was originally derived from commercial small game and

varmint cartridges used by hunters throughout the United States.

In most States, the .223 Remington cartridge, the commercial

version of the 5.56 x 45mm NATO, is outlawed for use against

deer-sized or larger game.  This restriction even includes the

explosive hollow-point versions using 68-grain projectiles.

Years of hunting experience has shown that the small 5.56 x 45mm

cartridge is incapable of consistently stopping deer-sized or

larger game.  Consequently, this cartridge is limited to game

such as woodchucks, gophers, turkeys, and prairie dogs.25  Is

this cartridge really adequate for human-sizes targets?

Soldiers can definitely carry more 5.56mm ammunition, but will

they be carrying more effective ammunition?  As a case in point,

battle experience in the Philippines, between government troops

(armed with the 5.56mm M16A1) and Communist rebels (armed with

vintage .30 Caliber M1 Garand and Browning automatic rifles), has

shown that the greater penetration capability of the older full

power cartridge gave the rebels superior effective firepower.26

     Another stated advantage of the smaller 5.56mm NATO

cartridge concerns the employment of shorter and lighter weapons.

Current versions of the Israeli Galil and FN FAL Paratroop rifles,

however, both in 7.62mm caliber, weigh only nine to ten pounds

fully loaded with twenty-round magazines.  These 7.62mm NATO

weapons also have shorter barrels and folding stocks that make

them very compact.  The new U. S. M16A2 and the new Belgian FN

FNC, both second generation 5.56mm NATO assault rifles, weigh

approximately eight27 and ten pounds,28 respectively, when fully

loaded with thirty-round magazines.  The purported reductions in

weight and improvements in compactness are really not significant.

     The lethality of the original M193 5.56mm projectile is

awesome, at ranges under 200 meters, due to the tendency of the

marginally stable 55-grain bullet to tumble or shatter on impact

with any target.  Lethality of the M193 5.56mm projectile beyond

200 meters, however, falls very sharply as range increases and

velocity decreases.29  The lethality of the new SS109 5.56mm

projectile on the battlefield is questionable.  The SS109

projectile is longer and heavier than the M193 projectile and is

more stabilized in flight with the faster rifling twist used in

second generation assault rifles.  The emphasis, in the develop-

ment of te SS109 projectile, was to increase stability and

therefore penetration at longer ranges.  The increased flight

stability of the new SS109 projectile does effectively enhance

penetration at longer ranges, but this same stability reduces the

projectile's tendency to tumble or shatter upon target im-

pact.30  As a result, the emphasis on penetration in the new

SS109 projectile may result in a sharp decrease in lethality, as

compared to its predecessor M193 cartridge.

     The adoption of intermediate power ammuntion by a large

number of countries was based on the limited ability of the

average soldier to discern and identify targets under battle

conditions.  The U. S. Army's ORO studies during the 1950's,

confirmed these ideas and established 300 meters as the practical

range limit for rifles under battle conditions.  The ORO studies,

however, failed to consider the technological advances of the

1970's and 1980's in the area of optical weapons sights.  The

battle proven British Trilux optical sight, with a four power

magnification, has been employed by the British effectively on

their 7.62mm FN FALs for many years.31  Their newly adopted 5.56mm

NATO individual weapon, the SA 80, utilizes a built-in version of

the Trilux called the SUSAT.32  The Austrian developed 5.56mm

NATO assault rifle, the AUG, employs a 1.5 power optical sight

built in to the weapon's carrying handle.33  The U. S. Army is

also considering a new optical sight for its version of the

M16A2.  These improved optical sights greatly increase the

average soldier's ability to see and identify enemy targets at

longer ranges.  As the soldier's ability to engage targets beyond

the 300 to 400 meter NATO limitation increases, the long range

accuracy limitations of the 5.56mm SS109 projectile will become

evident.  The 62-grain 5.56mm NATO projectile is significantly

more affected by weather conditions than the heavier projectile

of the 7.62mm NATO.  For example, at 400 meters the required

windage adjustment for a 10 mph crosswind for the SS109 cartridge

is approximately 9 clicks into the wind using the M16A2 sights.

Under the same conditions, the required windage adjustment for

the 7.62mm NATO cartridge is only 4 clicks using the M14 sights.

The larger sight adjustment, required for the SS109 projectile,

produces a greater margin of error that increases as distance

increases.  As the potential rifle engagement distances

increase, due to improvements in optical sights, the limited

accracy potential of the small 5.56mm NATO projectile will

severely limit any benefits that may be derived from such optical

improvements.

     New technological developments in body armor and individual

protection, such as kevlar and other light-weight ceramic and

composite armor, may soon defeat the penetration capability of

the small 5.56mm SS109 projectile.  For example, the new Soviet

5.45 x 39mm ammunition cannot now penetrate a relatively light

5.8 pound flak jacket composed to Kevlar and a 4.8mm (.19 inch)

sheet of hardened steel plate, even at point blank range.34  The

SS109 however, with its steel penetrator still has this

capability.  The primary question is how long will the 5.56mm

SS109 retain this capability?  As a second generation

intermediate power cartridge, further improvements in the small

5.56mm SS109 may not be sufficient to defeat new technological

developments in body armor.  The 5.56mm SS109 projectile is too

small for much significant improvement.

     It has also been maintained, by intermediate caliber propo-

nents, that the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge has proven itself in battle

since its adoption by the U. S. in 1963.  In most of these

conflicts, however, the 5.56mm weapons were employed against

opponents armed with Soviet weapons also using intermediate power

ammunition.  When the 5.56mm weapon comes up against an opponent

armed with weapons using full-power ammunition, such as in the

Philippine example cited previously, the 5.56mm armed soldier

finds himself at a severe disadvantage.

     The "obvious" advantages of the 5.56 x 45 mm NATO are not

obvious at all.  The SS109 is a definite improvement over the

first generation M193 cartridge however, at best it will serve

only as an interim standard.  As technological improvements in

optical sights extend the practical engagement distances for

rifle fire, and as improvements in body armor require greater and

greater power from the rifle cartridge, the SS109 and other

5.56mm caliber ammunition will have to give way to improve and

more powerful ammunition, such as the 7.62mm NATO.  The 7.62 x

51mm NATO has not been improved or modified since its adoption by

NATO in 1953.  This larger cartridge has a greater capacity for

growth and technological improvement and should be developed to

its potential now.  The large size of the 147-grain 7.62 mm

projectile is more than sufficient to incorporate significant

improvements in lethality and penetration.  We must capitalize on

the Soviet trend toward their 5.45mm caliber weapons by improving

our full power 7.62mm NATO ammunition and designing better and

more efficient weapons to use it.  We have a chance to totally

outclass Soviet small arms in the area of individual and squad

weapons.  Let's do it by upgrading the existing 7.62 mm NATO to

its full potential.

     During the years just prior to World War II, the  Imperial

Japanese Army replaced their 6.5mm (.256 Caliber) rifle ammuni-

tion with a 7.7mm (.303 Caliber) cartridge due to the smaller

round's poor lethality and its inability to penetrate barriers

and effectively stop enemy troops.  During the same period, the

Italians replaced their 6.5mm rifle ammunition with a 7.35mm

(.301 Caliber)  cartridge for the same reasons.  Lets learn from

their examples and concentrate now on the development and

improvement of the 7.62mm NATO round.  No, NATO does not need

two standard rifle caliblers.

Click here to view image

         Footnotes

     1Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 57,61.

     2IBID, Pp. 514 - 519.

     3IBID, Pp. 34 - 35.

     4Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Test Fires the AKS74,"

International Defense Review, October 1983, Pp. 1427 - 1428.

     5Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 779 - 784.

     6Edward C. Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy (Harrisburg:

Stackpole Books, 1984) P. 41.

     7IBID, Pp. 57 - 61.

     8IBID, Pp. 92 - 103.

     9Norman Hitchman, Operational Requirements For An Infantry

Hand Weapon (Chevy Chase: Operations Research Office - The John

Hopkins University Publications, 1952) Pp. 2 - 3.

    10William C. Benjamin Jr.  and Joseph Dubay, The Effect of

Rifle Caliber and Muzzle Velocity on Experimental Probabilities

of Hitting as Obtained from Project Caliber (Aberdeen: Ballistic

Research Laboratories Report No. 964, 1955) Pp. 29 - 30.

    11Edward C. Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy (Harrisburg:

Stackpole Books, 1984) P. 172.

    12IBID, P. 192

    13IBID, P. 195.

    14Herman Van Assche, "Small Arms and Their Ammunition - The

NATO Competition, "NATO's Fifteen Nations, August - September,

1981, Pp. 92-93.

    15R. T. Huntington, Small-Caliber Ammunition Identification

Guide Vol 1 (Army Material Development and Readiness Command,

Foreign Service and Technology Center, June 1978) Pp. 32.

    16Pierre Crevecoeur, "The Belgian SS-109 Round - Baseline

for NATO's Second Caliber Ammunition,"  International Defense

Review, March 1981, P. 302.

    17Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"

International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1353.

    18IBID, P. 1353

    19Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 59-60.

    20Pierre Crevecoeur,  "The Belgian SS-109 Round - Baseline

for NATO's Second Caliber Ammunition,"  International Defense

Review, March 1981, P. 302.

    21Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"

International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1353.

    22Edward C. Ezell, "NATO Small Arms Debate," International

Defense Review, March 1981, P. 297.

    23Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"

International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1352.

    24Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 64, 255.

    25Jack S. Chase, "Are We Arming American Soldiers to Flight

an Army of Woodchucks?"  Armed Forces Journal International,

October 1981, Pp. 24 - 26.

    26Interview with LTC Wenceslao Cruz, Philippine Marine

Corps, March 3, 1986.

    27Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"

International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1351.

    28Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) P. 255.

    29Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Test the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"

International Defense Review, September 1984, P.  1353.

    30Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) P. 60.

    31W. J. G. Hancock, "The TRILUX Infantry Sight Unit,"

International Defense Review, April 1973, Pp. 113 - 114.

    32Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 298 - 301.

    33IBID, P. 223.

    34Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the AK74," International

Defense Review, October 1983, Pp 1429 -1430.

    35Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) P. 603.

         Bibliography

1.  Benjamin, William C. and Dubay, Joseph A. The Effect of

     Rifle Caliber and Muzzle Velocity on Experimental

     Probabilities of Hitting as Obtained from Project

     Caliber, Ballisitic Research Laboratories Report

     No. 964, 1955.

2.  Chase, Jack S.  "Are We Arming American Soldiers to Fight an

     Army of Woodchucks?"  Armed Forces Jounal International.

     (October 1981) P. 24.

3.  Crevecouer, Pierre. "The Belgian SS-109 Round: Baseline for

     NATO's Second Caliber Ammunition."  International Defense

     Review (March 1981) P. 302

4.  Ezell, Edward C. Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised

     Edition.  Stackpole Books, 1983.

5.  Ezell, Edward C. The Great Rifle Controversy.  Stackpole

     Books, 1984.

6.  Ezell, Edward C.  "NATO Small Arms Debate - A Feeling of

     Deja Vu." International Defense Review (March 1981)

     P. 295.

7.  Hancock, W. J. G. "The TRILUX Infantry Sight," Inter-

     national Defense Review. (April 1973) P. 113.

8.  Hitchman, Norman, Operational Requirements for an

     Infantry Hand Weapon.  Operations Research Office -

     The John Hopkins University Publications, 1952.

9.  Hobart, F. W. A. "The Next NATO Rifle."  International

     Defense Review (February 1971) P. 64-70.

10. Huntington, R. T. Small-Caliber Ammunition Identifi-

     cation Guide - Vol 1.  Army Material Development  and

     Readiness Command, June 1978.

11. Marshall, S. L. A.  Men Against Fire, William Morrow

     and Company, 1947.

12. McDowall, D. N. "Caliber Counts."  Marine Corps Gazette

     (January 1965) P. 29.

13. Miller, Marshall Lee.  "In Changing Automatic Rifles,

     Soviets Kept Faith With Bullet Hose Theory,"  Armed

     Forces Jounal International  (March 1986) P.29.

14. Tillman, Andrew C.  "IDR Test Fires the AK74 Rifle."

     International Defense Review (October 1983)

15. Tillman, Andrew C.  "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle."

     International Defense Review (September 1984)

     P. 1353.

16. Van Assche, Herman.  "Small Arms and Their Ammunition - The

     NATO Competition."  NATO's Fifteen Nations  (August -

     September 1981) P. 92.

17. Watson, Mark.  "Search For A Better Individual Weapons."

     Ordnance  (June 1964) P. 11.

18. Weller, Jac.  "In An Age of Modern Sophisticated Weaponry,

     Where Is Our 20th Century Rifle?"  Infantry

     (July-August 1973) P. 12.

Lainaa



Cart.  W.  L.   Prop.Type   Prop.W. Bullet W.   Chamber Pres.  Velocity



5.56mm Ball, M193   182gr   2.26"   WC844 or CMR170   28.5 or 26.5gr   56gr   52,000psi   3250fps at 15' from muzzle

5.56mm Grenade, M195   126gr   1.9"   IMR4475   25gr   56gr       140-165fps at 66" from muzzle

5.56mm Tracer, M196   177gr   2.26"   WC844 or IMR8208M   28.5gr, 25.3gr or CMR170 26.5gr   54gr   52,000psi   3200fps at 15' from muzzle

5.56mm Ball, M855   190gr   2.26"   WC844   26.1gr   62gr   55,000psi   3025fps at 78' from muzzle

5.56mm Tracer, M856   191gr   2.26"   WC844   24.7gr   63.7gr   55,000psi   2870fps at 78' from muzzle

5.56mm Armor Piercing, M995   180gr   2.25"   WCR845   27.5gr   52gr   50,250psi   3324fps at 78' from muzzle







7.62mm Ball, M59   393gr   2.8"   WC846   46gr   150.5gr   50,000psi   2750fps at 78' from muzzle

7.62mm Armor Piercing, M61   393gr   2.8"   IMR4475   41gr   150.5gr   50,000psi   2750fps at 78' from muzzle

7.62mm Tracer, M62   383gr   2.8"   WC846   46gr   142gr   50,000psi   2750fps at 78' from muzzle

7.62mm Grenade, M64   295gr   2"   WC8:30   45gr   142gr   50,000psi   160fps at 5' from muzzle

7.62mm Ball, Special, M118   390gr   2.83"   WC846 and IMR4895   44gr   172gr   50,000psi   2640fps at

7.62mm Dim Tracer, M276   381gr   2.8"   WC846   46gr   140-150gr   50,000psi   2750fps (CMRS), 2680fps (GM) at 78' from muzzle

7.62mm Armor Piercing, M993   362.6gr   2.8"   Bonfors NC1290   45gr   126.6gr   55,115psi   2985fps at 78' from muzzle







Caliber .50 Incendiary, M1   1744gr   5.45"   WC860   240gr       54,000psi   2950fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Tracer, M1   1785gr   5.45"   IMR5010   240gr       52,000psi   2700fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Ball, M2   1813gr   5.45"   WC860   235gr       55,000psi   2810fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Armor Piercing, M2   1812gr   5.45"   WC860   235gr       53,000psi   2810fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Armor Piercing Incendiary, M8   1gr   5.45"   WC860   233gr   622.5gr   59,000psi   2910fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Tracer, M10   1752gr   5.45"   IMR5010   240gr       54,000psi   2860fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Tracer, M17   1732gr   5.45"   IMR5010   225gr       54,000psi   2860fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Armor Piercing Incendiary-Tracer, M20   1718gr   5.45"   IMR5010   230gr   619gr   55,000psi   2910fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Incendiary, M23   1581gr   5.45"   IMR4831   237gr       58,000psi   3400fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Ball, M33   1762gr   5.45"   WC860   235gr       55,000psi   2910fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP), M903   1466gr   5.45"   WC856   275gr   355-360gr   55,000psi   4000fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator-Tracer (SLAP-T), M962   1466gr   5.45"   WC856   282gr   350-360gr   55,000psi   4000fps at 78' from muzzle

Caliber .50 Armor Penetrator Incendiary (API), MK 211 MOD 0   1765gr   5.45"   WC860 / MR5010 or RA-NC-167   233gr   671gr   55,000psi   2910fps +30 at 78' from muzzle





Caliber & Type   Index   Bullet Type   Bullet Weight   Bullet Velocity   Max. Pressure Mpa   Cartridge

         Gram   Grain         Length (mm)   Weight

 (g)

5.45x39   7H6   SC   3.42   50   870-890   308.90   57.0   10.5

5.45x39   7H10   EP   3.61   56   870-890   321.20   57.0   10.7

5.45x39   7H22   AP   3.68   57   870-890   321.20   57.0   10.75

5.45x39   7X3   BLANK   -   -   -   -   56.8   6.6

7.62x39   57-H-231C   SC   7.90   122   710-725   299.10   56.0   16.3

7.62x39   7H23   AP   7.90   122   725-740   299.10   56.0   16.3

7.62x39   57-X-231   BLANK   -   -   -   -   48.2   8.2

7.62x54R   7H13   EP   9.56   148   820-835   284.40   77.16   21.72

5.56x45   NATO   SC   4.00   62   900-920   360.00   57.4   11.1

5.56x45   NATO   AP   4.00   62   900-920   360.00   57.40   11.1

7.62x51   NATO   SC   9.45   146   820-835   360.00   71.00   21.9

7.62x51   NATO   AP   9.43   146   820-835   360.00   71.0   21.9

9x18   57-H-181C   SC   5.95   92   V10=290-315   117.70   25.00   9.7

9.3x64   9 OCH 000   SC   16.70   258   755-770   313.80   88.8   35.25

14.4x114 Б-32   57-БЗ-561C   API   63.90   986   980-995   323.60   156.0   190.0

PPL   9-A-433 000   Explosive charge for overloading of aviation gun               255.00   60.0   27.1

Legend :

  SC - Steel Core bullet

  EP - Enhanced Penetration bullet

  AP - Armor Piercing bullet

  API - Armor Piercing Incendiary bullet  

Lainaa BASIC BALLISTICS

(Version 4:  26 June 2004)

© Anthony G Williams

 

I am often asked questions about the basic principles governing ballistics and related issues, so this is an attempt to provide some understanding of the most popular topics without getting too technical. I hasten to say that it has to be a basic guide as I am neither a physicist nor a mathematician, and I dislike complicated formulae. There are computer programmes available for working out advanced problems but I hope this article will at least point people in the right direction.

The study of ballistics is usually divided into three: internal, external and terminal. Internal ballistics concerns what happens between the cartridge being fired and the projectile leaving the muzzle (I will deal with recoil under this heading as well). External ballistics is concerned with the flight of the projectile from the muzzle to the target. Terminal ballistics describes what happens when the target is hit.



INTERNAL BALLISTICS

As soon as the primer ignites the propellant, gas is generated which rapidly builds up a considerable pressure. This pushes the projectile out of the case and up the barrel. The characteristics of propellant powders are such that the peak gas pressures are generated almost immediately, as the projectile begins its trip up the barrel. That is why the gun steel is thickest at this point. As the projectile accelerates up the barrel, it makes space for the gas to expand so gas pressure declines. It is still significant when the projectile leaves the muzzle, resulting in a rapid expansion into the open air causing the characteristic sound of a gun firing. This final expansion, coupled with the end of the friction between the projectile and the barrel, results in a final boost to the projectile so its maximum velocity is attained just beyond the muzzle (although "muzzle velocity" is usually measured at several metres past the muzzle anyway).

Silenced weapons trap the expanding gas to prevent it from bursting violently out of the muzzle, usually by providing it with space to expand within the silencer in a controlled way, to be released slowly afterwards. This is why silencers have to be bulky.

Different weapons operate at different gas pressures; pistols and shotguns generally work at much lower pressures than rifles and automatic cannon. Some 9mm pistol ammunition intended for sub-machine guns is loaded to higher pressures than normal in order to generate higher velocities. It can be dangerous to use this ammunition in a pistol, unless its design is very strong. Rifle and cannon ammunition is generally loaded up to the highest practical pressure level, taking into account barrel wear, the risk of a case being stuck to the chamber and other potential problems.

 

MUZZLE ENERGY

The cartridge develops a "muzzle energy" figure, either in joules (metric) or foot-pounds (ft lbs). This is calculated as follows (please note that although the correct term is "mass", I have used "weight" instead for easier comprehension. Mass is a constant regardless of gravitational pull, whereas weight depends on the gravity. However, on the Earth's surface the two are effectively the same):

Joules: multiply the projectile weight in grams by the square of the muzzle velocity in metres per second (m/s), then divide the result by 2,000. So a 40g projectile fired at 800 m/s will generate (40 x 800 x 800)/2,000 = 12,800j

Foot-pounds: multiply the projectile weight in pounds by the square of the muzzle velocity in feet per second (fps), then divide the result by 64. Note that there are 7,000 grains in a pound, so for bullet calculations you can enter the weight in grains then divide the resulting calculation by 7,000.

To convert foot-pounds to joules, multiply by 1.348.

To convert joules to foot-pounds, multiply by 0.742.

15.432 grains = 1 gram, 2.205 pounds = 1 kg and 3.281 feet = 1 metre

Note that in developing muzzle energy, muzzle velocity is much more important than projectile weight. Doubling the muzzle velocity of a projectile quadruples its energy, whereas doubling the projectile weight only doubles its energy.

The muzzle energy which is generated by a given amount of propellant will depend on the calibre (spelled "caliber" in the USA) of the gun. Think of the barrel as the cylinder of an engine, and the bullet as a piston. In a small-calibre weapon, the gas has a very small piston area - the base of the bullet - on which to work. As the pressure it can generate is limited, it can only apply a limited amount of force to the bullet. In a larger calibre weapon, the piston area is greater so the same amount of propellant can do more work. This explains why, in the case of a rifle cartridge made in several different calibres (e.g. the .30-06, also made in .25, .27 and .35 calibres), there is usually a direct relationship between the calibre and the muzzle energy generated; the bigger the calibre, the higher the muzzle energy from a given quantity of propellant.

For a given calibre, there is a practical limit to the amount of propellant which can be used. The law of diminishing returns applies, and using bigger cartridge cases holding more propellant will achieve ever-smaller increases in velocity from the extra propellant. A cartridge which is so big as to be unable to use all its propellant efficiently is described as "over bore". Such cartridges have very unpleasant firing characteristics, with high levels of flash and blast, and usually wear out barrels quickly. They also need long barrels to give the necessarily slow-burning propellant time to generate a high velocity, which can be inconvenient.

Incidentally, in any given cartridge different projectile weights may produce different energy levels; typically, an "average" weight for the calibre produces the highest energy, with unusually light or heavy projectiles doing less well. This may in part reflect the characteristics of the propellant, although these are adjustable; heavier projectiles need slower-burning powders to keep the pressure peak down, whereas light projectiles need faster-burning powders to accelerate them quickly enough to reach a high velocity. Very heavy projectiles may protrude deeper into the case, reducing the space for propellant.

What is the maximum velocity which a projectile can be pushed to? This is ultimately limited by the expansion rate of the gas from the burning propellant. In rifles, the practical limit is around 1,200 m/s ( nearly 4,000 fps) achieved in small-calibre guns which only need light bullets (plus a couple of WW2 7.92mm anti-tank rifles). This is also about the maximum velocity for cannon firing conventional full-calibre HE shells. The highest velocities currently achieved are in tank guns firing APFSDS shot, which is extremely light for the caliber and allows velocities to be pushed up to 1,800 m/s (nearly 6,000 fps), which is close to the theoretical limit for conventional powder propellants. To go much faster would require a different technology. There is more on this subject in In Search of High Velocity on this website.

The barrel length in comparison with the calibre is obviously an important factor in muzzle velocity. In cannon calibres, this is expressed as the "calibre length", which is simply the length of the barrel divided by the calibre. For example, the current Bofors 40mm gun has a barrel 2.8m long, and therefore has a calibre length of 70, expressed as L/70. The WW2 Bofors had a less powerful cartridge and needed a calibre length of only L/56.



RECOIL

The recoil force generated by firing a gun has two components; the momentum of the projectile, and of the escaping gas. Projectile momentum is easy to calculate; just multiply the projectile weight by its muzzle velocity (so a cartridge firing a 10g bullet at 1,000 m/s should have the same bullet momentum as one firing a 20g bullet at 500 m/s). Note that this is a different calculation from muzzle energy, as bullet weight and muzzle velocity are of equal value. This explains why in different bullet-weight loadings of the same cartridge which generate the same muzzle energy, the heavy bullet loading will produce heavier recoil.

The recoil caused by the escaping gas - a kind of "rocket effect" - is much more difficult to calculate because it depends on the relationship between the burning characteristics of the propellant and the length of the barrel. If you assume two rifles firing the same cartridge, one with a barrel of optimum length and the other with a much shorter barrel, the optimum length one will produce the higher muzzle velocity and therefore the greater recoil through bullet momentum. However, in the short-barrel gun the gas will be at a higher pressure when the bullet leaves the muzzle, and will therefore expand more violently, causing more muzzle blast and flash and generating a stronger "rocket effect". In this case, a higher proportion of the recoil will be generated by the expanding gas than with the optimum barrel.

For this reason, there is no simple ratio which will tell you exactly what proportion of the recoil is generated by the escaping gas as opposed to the projectile. However, a good approximation can be made, based on the weight multiplied by the velocity of the propellant compared with the weight multiplied by the velocity of the projectile. In a large number of empirical tests, the velocity of the gas escaping from the muzzle of a rifle has been determined to be 1,200 m/s (4,000 fps) plus or minus 10%. In larger high-velocity military weapons, which can operate at very high pressures and velocities, the escaping gas velocity may be significantly higher.

It is therefore fairly simple to work out what proportion of the recoil impulse is generated by the escaping gas. Take for example the 7.62x51 NATO military rifle/MG cartridge in M80 ball loading. This uses 3.0g (46 grains) of propellant to fire a 9.5g (146 grain) bullet at a muzzle velocity of 840 m/s (2,750 fps). The calculation goes like this (the units of measurement don't matter as long as they are used consistently):

Bullet momentum: 9.5 x 840 = 8,000 (rounded). Propellant momentum: 3.0 x 1,200 = 3,600. So the total recoil momentum is 8,000 + 3,600 = 11,600, of which the gas produces 3,600 / 11,600 x 100 = 31%

This figure of around 30% is typical for a medium-velocity rifle cartridge. In a higher-velocity rifle like the 5.56mm NATO it is in the region of 35-40%. In handguns it is much lower, in the region of 10-15%, although in the big Magnums it can exceed 20%. In powerful military cannon it can be as high as 50%.

The only way of reducing the recoil force generated by a cartridge, while maintaining the muzzle energy, is to reduce the effect of the escaping gas by diverting some of it, either to one side or (preferably) to the rear. A device to achieve this is known as a muzzle brake. The extent to which a muzzle brake can reduce recoil obviously depends upon the proportion of the recoil impulse generated by the propellant gas - it gives the greatest benefit in very powerful, high-velocity weapons. One text on military cannon states that an efficient muzzle brake can reduce the recoil impulse by up to 30%. Higher figures are possible, but only by using brakes which are so large that they would be impractical. A disadvantage of a muzzle brake is that the rearwards-deflected gas greatly increases the muzzle blast and noise perceived by the firer, and may also kick up dust, revealing the weapon's position and affecting the user's visibility.

A type of muzzle brake is the compensator. This deflects some of the muzzle blast upwards in order to counteract the tendency for the gun barrel of a hand-held weapon to point upwards as a result of recoil. It is therefore mainly found in powerful handguns, or in automatic weapons like sub-machine guns.

Of course, a recoilless gun deflects most of the gas directly behind the weapon, so in this case the "rocket effect" more or less balances the projectile momentum. However, this requires the use of several times as much propellant as with a conventional gun of the same muzzle energy, so the ammunition is bulky and expensive.

So far I have only discussed the "recoil force" as opposed to the recoil experienced. This is because the recoil experienced depends on the weapon, and on the mounting. In the case of a rifle or handgun, the weight of the weapon has a significant effect. Momentum works both ways, equally (you can't defeat Newton's law of equal and opposite reactions!), so the rearwards momentum of the gun matches the forwards momentum of the bullet plus the expanding gas. It therefore follows that the heavier the weapon, the more slowly it will move backwards under recoil, giving a smooth push rather than the sharper kick of a lighter weapon firing the same ammunition. The recoil momentum experienced by the firer is the same, but it is delivered in a different way; the lighter weapon, recoiling more quickly, has the same momentum but higher energy and is perceived to "kick harder".

For instance, let's take our 7.62x51 NATO cartridge and work out the recoil energy it would generate in different rifles. As we have seen, the cartridge generates a total recoil impulse of 11,600 (grams per metre per second). If a rifle weighs 4.0 kg (8.8.lbs) or 4,000g, it will therefore be pushed back at 11,600 / 4,000 = 2.9 metres per second. 4.0 kg at 2.9 m/s = 17 joules (whereas the cartridge develops 3,350 joules - which shows the importance of velocity in calculating energy). If a lightweight rifle of only 3.0 kg (6.6 lbs) is used to fire the same cartridge, it will be pushed back at 11,600 / 3,000 = 3.9 m/s, producing 23 joules muzzle energy - an increase in recoil energy of 35%, even though the recoil momentum is the same.

To translate this into practical consequences, the 7.62x51 NATO cartridge generates only about double the recoil momentum of the 5.62x45 NATO, but in rifles of the same weight this translates to double the rifle recoil speed, therefore four times the recoil energy. An intermediate military rifle cartridge like the Russian 7.62x39 used in the famous Kalashnikov AK 47 rifle fits about half-way between the 7.62x51 and 5.56x45 in recoil generated; regarded as around the maximum for (just about) controllable automatic fire in a military rifle.

Self-loading weapons, whether recoil or gas-operated, tend to reduce the perceived recoil because some of the energy is used to drive the reloading mechanism. The shape of the weapon can also affect the perceived recoil; in rifles, a "straight" stock which directs the recoil impulse into the shoulder causes less barrel jump than a dropped stock, which has the thrust line over the shoulder. In handguns, a revolver has a higher thrust line than other types and this may also cause more perceived recoil (although in the old-fashioned type of "western" revolver, the grip tends to rotate in the hand, absorbing some of the kick at the cost of considerable muzzle jump).

In heavier military guns which are fitted to mountings, the nature of the mounting can make quite a difference. In all but the lightest weapons, the mounting allows the gun to recoil backwards between shots (there is commonly some kind of buffer). Note that this doesn't reduce the recoil force - only a muzzle brake can do that - it merely reduces the peak recoil blow by spreading out the recoil force over a longer period and thereby puts less strain on the mounting (or to put it another way, allows a lighter mounting to be used). Detail design can make a big difference; the US Edgewater mounting used on aircraft HMG and cannon mountings in WW2 substantially reduced the peak recoil blow.

An even more effective way of doing this is with a differential recoil or floating firing mounting, in which the gun is held back in the full recoil position before firing. On firing, the gun runs forwards "into battery" and the weapon is fired just before it gets there. The recoil force therefore has to overcome the forwards momentum of the gun before it can start pushing it back again. This is a highly effective way of smoothing out the recoil pulses and is commonly used in modern automatic AA cannon.

Some automatic gun mechanisms have a greater recoil-smoothing effect than others. One of them is the long-recoil type, in which the barrel recoils a considerable distance between shots. This makes for a slow-firing gun and is mainly used in large-calibre weapons. It was commonly used in large aircraft cannon in WW2, such as the US 37mm and the British 40mm and 57mm guns - the big 57mm Molins had a peak recoil blow similar to that of the 20mm Hispano (although the total recoil thrust was obviously much greater). The other is the advanced primer ignition blowback type, as pioneered by Becker in WW1 and much used by Oerlikon and similar weapons in WW2. In this, the gun fires from an open bolt, which means that when the firing button is pressed, the bolt moves forwards and chambers a cartridge before firing. The key point of the API blowback is that the cartridge is fired while it is still moving forwards, so there is a kind of internal differential recoil effect.

There is a popular fallacy that firing a large-calibre cannon in an aircraft (such as the 75mm M4 in the B-25) had a drastic effect on aircraft speed - or even briefly brought it to a stop! A simple comparison of speeds and weights between the shell and the aircraft will show that the aircraft had about 200 times the momentum of the shell. Firing several shots in quick succession would slow the plane a little, but not by more than about 5%.



EXTERNAL BALLISTICS

Just two key factors determine the external ballistics of a projectile; the muzzle velocity and the ballistic coefficient. The ballistic coefficient is significant because it determines the rate at which the projectile slows down, and in conjunction with the muzzle velocity this decides the maximum range (at any given elevation) and the time of flight to any particular distance. The time of flight in turn decides the amount by which the projectile drops downwards as this happens at a constant rate due to gravity. The curved path of the projectile which results from the muzzle velocity, the ballistic coefficient and gravity drop is called the trajectory.

In most types of long-range shooting (whether by rifles or large cannon) a short time of flight is considered desirable because it maximizes the hit probability by reducing the time of flight and flattening the trajectory. It also results in the projectile striking the target at a high velocity and therefore with greater effect. The main exception is when artillery fires in the "upper register" (above 45 degrees elevation) to achieve plunging fire.

The advantages of a high muzzle velocity in reducing the time of flight are self-evident. So are the disadvantages: more propellant is required, the barrel will need to be longer, the gun will be heavier and (in the case of a mounted weapon) so will be the mounting to cope with the greater recoil. In an automatic weapon, the rate of fire is also usually lower. As we have seen, there is also a practical limit to how high the velocity of any given projectile can be pushed. To make the most of the muzzle velocity, we need to achieve a high ballistic coefficient.

There are two elements which decide the ballistic coefficient (BC); the sectional density (SD) and the form factor (FF). The SD is a simple calculation as it is the ratio between calibre and projectile weight. The formula is:

For metric measurements: multiply the projectile weight in grams by 1.422, then divide the result by the square of the calibre in millimetres. So for a 12.7mm bullet weighing 40 grams: (40x1.422)/(12.7x12.7) = an SD of 0.353

For Imperial measurements: divide the projectile weight in pounds by the square of the calibre in inches (if bullet weights are in grains, divide the result by 7,000).

The higher the SD figure, the better the velocity retention (assuming equal form factors).

What the SD measures is the weight (or momentum, when moving) behind every square millimetre of the projectile calibre (i.e. the cross-sectional area of the projectile). If projectiles were solid cylinders then for a given SD figure they would all be the same length regardless of their calibre. In practice, of course, the length varies with the calibre; a 40mm projectile will be about twice the length of a 20mm, and will therefore have about double the SD figure. This explains why artillery shells travel much further than rifle bullets, no matter how fast or streamlined. Other things being equal, the bigger the calibre, the longer the range and the shorter the flight time to any given range.

Other things are of course far from equal, which is where the form factor comes in. The FF measures the aerodynamic efficiency of the projectile's shape, and is much more complicated to calculate; without access to manufacturers' data, only approximate estimates can be made. It is obvious that a projectile with a pointed nose will have much less air resistance than a simple cylinder, and it will therefore have a better FF, but problems arise when you try to become more specific.

The first problem is that the FF is different at subsonic and supersonic velocities, because shapes which work best at subsonic speeds are not the best at supersonic velocities. At subsonic speeds, the drag caused by the low-pressure area created at the back or base of the projectile is significant, and major reductions in drag can be made by tapering this to some extent (boat-tailing). At supersonic speeds, it is the nose shape that is critical; finely pointed noses are needed, but the back end doesn't matter so much. Some taper towards the base is useful, but the optimum taper angle is different from that at subsonic velocities. The benefit of boat-tailing at very long range can be demonstrated by two .30-06 bullets, both weighing 180 grains (11.7g) and fired at 2,700 fps (823 m/s). At sea level, the flat-based bullet will travel a maximum of 3,800m, the boat-tail 5,200m.

A further factor affecting military projectiles is the addition of tracer elements. These generate gas which helps to fill the low-pressure area at the base, reducing drag. This gives them a different trajectory by comparison with non-tracer rounds, not helped by the fact that as the tracer burns up the weight of the projectile reduces, thereby worsening its sectional density. Tracers can therefore never achieve a perfect match with other projectiles and can only ever be an approximate guide to their trajectory.

Putting all of this together, the most aerodynamically sophisticated projectiles in use today are the long-range artillery shells known as ERFBBB (extended-range full-bore base-bleed). These have a long, finely pointed nose to work well at their initial supersonic speeds, and a tapered base filled with a "base bleed" burning chemical which essentially does the same aerodynamic job as a tracer. Furthermore, the nose is so pointed that only the base of the shell is in contact with the barrel, so small streamlined stubs are fitted part way up the shell to keep it centred in the bore. It was discovered that these generate some aerodynamic lift, like tiny wings, and extend the range still further. The advantage of all of this can be seen in the range improvement over a conventional 155mm HE shell; in a 39 calibre barrel, the standard M107 shell has a range of 18,100m, the ERFB shell 25,500m and the ERFBBB 32,400m. Furthermore, unlike rocket-assisted or sub-calibre shells, there is no penalty in effectiveness as they carry at least as much HE (in fact, the South African 155mm M57 ERFB shell contains 30% more HE than the standard M107 shell).

It is possible to obtain some idea of typical FFs by comparing manufacturers' BC data with the calculated SDs for the same projectiles. In the case of small arms bullets, this provides the following approximate FFs (this figure should be multiplied by the SD to give the BC):

Flat-nose lead: 0.8

Round-nose lead: 0.9

Round-nose jacketed: 1.0

Semi-pointed soft point: 0.9-1.1

Pointed soft point: 1.2-1.6 (depending on sharpness of point)

Pointed full jacket: 1.5-1.8

Pointed full-jacket boat-tailed: 1.9-2.0

Comparing the BCs with ballistic tables for the ammunition gives the following results. These figures show the approximate percentage velocity loss over 100m for supersonic projectiles (900 m/s) with the following BCs:

BC       0.15   0.20   0.25   0.30   0.35   0.40   0.45   0.50

V loss  %   25   18   14   11.5   9.5   8   7   6.5

Another type of Form Factor is traditionally used for artillery - and especially naval - shells. This is the "caliber radius head" (CRH) which measures how pointed the nose is. To give an example, if the curve of a shell nose is the same as that of a circle with a radius of 500mm in diameter, and the calibre is 100mm, then the shell has a CRH of 5. The higher the CRH, the better the FF.

In calculating SD and BC, it should be noted that the notional cartridge calibre is not necessarily the same as the actual projectile diameter, particularly with small arms. The bore diameter (ie the inside diameter of the barrel ignoring any rifling grooves) may be used instead, or some notional figure. The following list of bullet calibres is followed by some of the common cartridge designations of that calibre (there are many other calibres and cartridges...):

Bullet diameter                         Cartridge designation

mm/inches

5.60/.221                                     5.45mm Russian

5.69/.224                                     5.56mm, 5.6mm, .218, 219, .22, .220, .221, .222, .223, .224, .225, .226

6.17/.243                                     6mm, .240, .243, .244

6.53/.257                                     6.35mm, .25, .250, .257

6.71/.264                                     6.5mm, .256, .260, .264

7.04/.277                                    .270, .277

7.21/.284                                     7mm, .275, .276, .280, .284

7.82/.308                                     7.5mm, 7.62mm, 7.63mm, 7.65mm, .30, .300, .307, .308

7.90/.311                                     7.62mm (Russian), 7.65mm (Belgian), 7.7mm, .303, .311

8.20/.323                                     7.92mm, 8mm (most - but not all)

8.59/.338                                     8.58mm, .33, .330, .338, .340

12.9/.510                                    12.7mm (Russian), .50

13.1/.514                                    12.7mm (Breda, Ho-103), .5 (Vickers)

13.5/.530                                    13mm (IJN Type 3 and 96), 13.2mm (Hotchkiss)

13.5/.533                                    13mm MG 131, 13mm IJN Type 2

15.6/.614                                    15mm MG 151

16.2/.638                                    15mm ZB vz/60, Besa

19.8/.780                                    20mm ShVAK, B-20

19.9/.785                                    20mm (other)

22.9/.900                                    23mm VYa, ZU

24.9/.980                                    25mm (general)

26.9/1.06                                    27mm Mauser

29.9/1.18                                    30mm (general)

35.0/1.38                                    35mm Oerlikon

36.8/1.45                                    37mm (general), 1 pdr, 1.5 pdr

39.9/1.57                                    40mm (general), 2 pdr

47.0/1.85                                    47mm, 3 pdr

50.0/1.97                                    50mm, 5 cm

56.9/2.24                                    57mm, 6 pdr

An important aspect of external ballistics is the stability of the projectile. If an ordinary bullet or cannon shell were fired from a smoothbored gun, it would probably start to tumble, ruining its aerodynamics and accuracy. Old-fashioned smoothbore muskets fired round balls, so tumbling wasn't a problem, but such a shape has a poor BC. Even round balls fired from smoothbores tend to drift off target as the range increases anyway, as they will not be entirely symmetrical. The answer was found to be to cause the bullet to spin rapidly by cutting spiral grooves into the barrel, called rifling. This evens out any asymmetries and keeps pointed bullets heading point-first.

Initially, bullets and shells were provided with studs to fit into the rifling but these were slow to load. An alternative approach was to make a polygonal-section barrel with shells manufactured to fit. Subsequently, rifles were provided with Minié type bullets which had a hollow base, designed to expand under the pressure of firing and "take" the rifling. Modern rifle, pistol and heavy machine gun (HMG) bullets are given a metal jacket (usually cupro-nickel) which has a slightly larger diameter than the bore of the gun. It is therefore squeezed into the rifling grooves on firing, which leaves characteristic angled grooves engraved into the bullet. Modern cannon shells are usually made of steel which is too hard for this, so they are given a driving band near the base of the projectile, which is larger in diameter than the shell and is gripped by the rifling. The driving bands are traditionally copper but this is too soft for modern high-velocity cannon which normally use soft steel driving bands instead. The 30mm projectile for the US GAU-8/A cannon are unusual in using plastic driving bands.

With large-calibre, high-velocity cannon there is some risk of the shock of impact with the rifling "stripping" the driving band. To combat this, some weapons have progressive rifling, in which the rifling grooves start out parallel then gradually increase in twist down the barrel. In a return to earlier "studded" shell principles, the WW1 Paris Guns had pre-engraved rifling bands to minimise the friction and the risk of stripping the band.

There is also some concern with cannon that the driving bands, which stick out from the shell body and tend to be rather chewed up by the rifling, have a poor effect on aerodynamics. One solution to this problem is to include a smooth (unrifled) final section of the barrel at the same diameter as the shell, which squeezes the driving band flat against the projectile. This is known as a "Probertised" barrel (technically "RD Rifling") after Probert, the British inventor, and was used in the high-velocity 3.7" Mk VI AA gun in World War 2.

Rifling permits a high degree of accuracy over the maximum range of a weapon. There is a relationship between the rifling twist (the angle of the rifling to the barrel) and the length of the projectile. For a given calibre, the longer (ie heavier) the projectile, the steeper the twist has to be in order to stabilise it. Clearly, with a particular rifling twist some light projectiles will be very stable, some medium-weight ones marginally stable and some heavy ones not stabilised at all. This can have consequences for the terminal as well as the external ballistics, as we shall see. As projectiles become steadily longer so rifling can no longer cope, and long, thin projectiles such as APFSDS (armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding-sabot) require fins, like arrows, at the back to keep them pointing, nose-first, in the right direction. Such projectiles are disturbed by rifling and work better from an (almost) smoothbore barrel (some degree of spin is considered useful in effecting clean sabot separation). HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank, also known as hollow-charge) projectiles also work best when not spun, so these two types of munitions have become associated with smoothbore barrels, almost exclusively fitted to AFVs. Recently, automatic cannon with rifled barrels have taken to using APFSDS, but the spinning causes the projectiles to yaw (fail to point straight ahead) for several hundred metres, so they only become fully effective at 400+m.

The optimum elevation for achieving the maximum range depends on the range capability. Large caliber, high-velocity artillery (e.g. the WW1 German Paris Guns) achieved their maximum range of around 75 miles at an elevation of 55 degrees, because aerodynamic drag reduces along with air pressure so the sooner the shell gets up into the thin upper air the further it will travel. Rifle bullets are restricted to the lower atmosphere and their optimum elevation is about 30-35 degrees. For the same reason, an aircraft gun will have a much longer effective range at high altitude than in the thick air at ground level.



TERMINAL BALLISTICS

There are two different aspects to this; the effect of projectile strike against soft targets (animals or people) and the effect against armour.

First, against soft targets (the squeamish have permission to duck this section!). A military (i.e. fully jacketed, pointed, non-expanding) rifle bullet will be destabilised when hitting a soft target and will tumble. This is because its shape means that the centre of gravity of the bullet is towards the rear so it naturally prefers to fly base-first. Spinning the bullet by means of the rifling keeps the bullet flying point-first through the air, but flesh is about 400 times denser than air so spinning is no longer enough; the bullet destabilises and turns over to travel base-first, a process known as tumbling.  In so doing it obviously inflicts a far more serious wound than if it carried on flying straight through the body. Incidentally, bullets designed for penetrating heavy game animals like elephant - which need to penetrate very deeply and must therefore not tumble - have long, parallel sides and blunt round noses, just like early military rifle bullets.

Not all bullets tumble at the same rate. Other things being equal, small bullets will tumble more quickly than large ones, but the design of the bullet is also important; some visibly identical bullets will tumble at different speeds, generally depending on the internal construction. For example, the Yugoslavian bullet for the 7.62x39 has a lead core and has been found in tests to tumble much more quickly than the Russian steel-cored bullet in the same cartridge. Readiness to tumble may also be affected by how well-stabilised the bullet has been by the rifling. A well-stabilised bullet may pass straight through the target without having time to tumble. The original US Army .223 (5.56mm) 55 grain (3.56g) M193 bullet was notorious for rapid tumbling, but the current NATO 62 grain (4.02g) SS109/M855 bullet is fired from rifles with a much steeper rifling twist (1 turn in 7 inches - 18cm - instead of 1 in 12 - 30cm) and is more stable, to the benefit of long-range accuracy and penetration but at the cost of a slightly slower rate of tumble on impact. Various tricks have been used to increase the probability of a bullet tumbling; the British .303 Mk VII bullet had a lightweight tip filler with the weight concentrated towards the rear of the bullet, and the current Russian 5.45mm rifle bullet has a hollow tip.

If a bullet has a relatively weak jacket, the stresses of tumbling may cause it to break apart while it is travelling sideways through flesh - a process known as fragmentation - which further increases the wounding effect. Most 5.56x45 military bullets fragment, although they have to be travelling at high velocity to do so. This limits their maximum effectiveness to fairly short range, particularly from short-barrelled carbines which have a lower muzzle velocity. Most 7.62x51 NATO bullets do not fragment, although the German one does - by accident rather than design. Fragmentation is not an official requirement for any military bullets; if it were, there might be some legal challenge over the international prohibition on bullets designed to cause unnecessary suffering. The noses of hunting rifle bullets (and many commercial handgun bullets) are designed to expand on impact, which greatly increases the size of the wound channel.  Such bullets are illegal for military use.

It is often claimed by hunters that as the striking velocity of the bullet increases beyond about 700 m/s (2,300 fps), so hydrostatic shock begins to appear, with the effect that animals drop dead much more dramatically than if hit in the same place with a low-velocity bullet. However, this effect does not seem to be replicated in people; there are many cases of soldiers continuing to fight for some time despite receiving severe (and ultimately fatal) wounds from high-velocity rifle bullets. Furthermore, serious shock effects are only likely if the bullet exceeds the speed of sound in flesh, which is around 1,500 m/s (4,900 fps), but even this has been disputed.

This brings us onto the vexed question of stopping power, about which it is impossible to make any pronouncements without stimulating fierce arguments. Stopping power may be defined as the ability of a particular weapon to immediately disable an opponent so he can take no further part in the fighting. It is not the same as lethality; quite low-powered weapons can be lethal, but considerably more power is normally required to achieve reliable stopping power. Incidentally, this shows that the notion that modern military rifle bullets are meant to wound rather than kill is a myth; if it is powerful enough to disable, it is more than powerful enough to kill.

Clearly, bullet placement is vital to achieving effective stopping power; it is much more effective to hit an immediately vital area with a low-powered weapon than to inflict a minor wound with a high-powered one. Also, the psychological state of the target has a considerable effect. Someone who is relaxed, or frightened, may be put out of the fight by a minor wound, someone who is highly charged with aggression will require far more power to stop them, and yet another person high on drugs may continue fighting despite suffering the most appalling wounds.

Stopping power is simplest to define with pistols, which have too low a velocity for hydrostatic shock to be a factor. The classic formula, named after the American Julius Hatcher, is calculated by multiplying the bullet weight by the muzzle velocity and then by the square of the calibre. The result is then multiplied by a form factor, similar in principle to that used for calculating the BC, except that in this case, the blunter the bullet shape the more effective it is. It will immediately be seen that calibre is the most important factor, and indeed large calibre pistols such as the .45" have always had a good reputation for stopping power. It should be noted that even the most powerful handgun or rifle will not physically knock someone down; if they were that powerful, Newton's law would require the firer to be thrown backwards with equal force. The recent spread of body armour has changed the perceptions of desirable pistol ballistics to some extent, as a high-velocity small-calibre bullet will punch through body armour which will easily stop a large-calibre, low-velocity bullet.

This brings us onto the subject of penetration. This is not just to do with military armour, but also against tough animals like elephants or water buffalo. As already indicated, early big game hunters found that the most important characteristics of a bullet against such tough game were that it should be round-nosed, strongly built, and have a good SD. A pointed bullet would not follow a straight path through a mass of bone, and one with too high a velocity also often followed an erratic path. Amazingly, one of the most successful early elephant guns (albeit only in very skilled hands) was the little 6.5mm Mannlicher. Why? Because its very long, 160 grain (10.4g), round-nosed bullet and its moderate velocity allowed it to penetrate remarkable thicknesses of bone - but it was only effective with a precise aim.

The subject of the penetration of armour is highly technical and complex. Furthermore, different national definitions of penetration and different types and qualities of armour used to test projectiles against make comparisons difficult. However, certain broad principles still hold generally true. As with elephant guns, a high SD is desirable and so (more surprisingly) is a blunt nose, although this is often concealed by a pointed ballistic cap or windshield. However, one major difference is that the higher the striking velocity the better, at least until the velocities are so high that the projectile is more likely to shatter than penetrate. For hardened steel penetrators, this happens at velocities much over 1,000 m/s.



SUB-CALIBRE PROJECTILES

This term is used to describe projectiles which are smaller than the calibre of the gun they are fired from. Nowadays this normally means APDS or APFSDS, but I will also deal with two related developments; APCR and squeezebore guns.

As we have seen, a large caliber will permit more energy to be generated than a small one. On the other hand, for a given projectile weight a smaller caliber will have a higher SD and therefore better long-range and AP performances. Designers have therefore tried different ways of combining the advantages of the two.

The simplest type was known to the British in WW2 as APCR (armour piercing, composite rigid - I have seen an early document which referred to this as "composite rigid armour piercing" but they presumably thought better of the acronym...), to the Americans as HVAP (high velocity armour piercing) and to the Germans as Hartkernmunition or Pzgr.40. However, it was probably the French who fielded it first, in the M1935 loading for the little 37x94R round still being used in some tank guns (there's a picture of one, plus sub-calibre projectiles, in the photo gallery on this website). It is nowadays commonly known as APHC, for armour piercing hard core, and is mainly used in MGs, HMGs and small-calibre cannon.

As the names suggest, this consists of a lightweight projectile (normally mainly aluminium) with a hard, small calibre core (normally tungsten alloy, which is heavier and harder than steel). The light projectile in a large-calibre gun gives a high muzzle velocity but when it strikes the target, only the hard core penetrates so it can go through much more armour than a full-calibre projectile of the same weight. The only disadvantage is that the light projectile has a low SD and therefore slows down more quickly than a normal projectile, steadily losing its penetration advantage as the range increases. To overcome this problem, later versions tended to be little if any lighter than a standard shell, thereby trading some of their short-range penetration for better long-range effectiveness. A modern example of this is the 30mm API used in the GAU-8/A cannon fitted to the A-10 aircraft; this is also unusual in having a depleted uranium core.

Another approach to achieving the best of both worlds was the squeezebore gun, of which there were two basic types; the Gerlich and the Littlejohn. In both, a projectile fitted with flanges to fit a large caliber barrel was squeezed down to a smaller caliber before it left the muzzle. The difference between them was that the Gerlich guns had tapered barrels whereas the Littlejohns had normal barrels with a tapered attachment fitted to the muzzle, in principle not unlike a shotgun choke. These worked very well and both saw limited service in WW2, the Gerlich in some German AT guns and the Littlejohn (named after the Czech designer, Janecek, which translates as little John) in some Allied armoured car and light tank guns. Their main problem, apart from the cost of the tungsten-cored ammo (and in the case of the Gerlich, the expensive barrel manufacturing) was that they could only fire this type of ammunition; they could not fire full-calibre HE shells. For this reason, they lost favour as soon as a better solution emerged.

The better solution was APDS, for armour piercing discarding sabot. This was like the APCR shell, except that the light alloy sabot (French for shoe) was designed to fall away from the small-calibre penetrator as soon as the projectile left the muzzle. This therefore combined the advantages of a large caliber for maximum energy with a small caliber for best flight and penetration performance, and allowed conventional ammunition to be fired from the same gun. It was initially designed in France before WW2, but was then developed in Canada and the UK, being issued for British 6pdr and 17pdr guns from mid-1944 onwards.

Apart from the cost and availability of the tungsten (always an issue in WW2) the only problem was that early version were very inaccurate because the flight of the projectile was disturbed by sabot separation. The British carried on using conventional AP tank ammunition into the 1950s, and APDS only really became supreme with the British 105mm tank gun of the late 1950s, which became the NATO standard for many years.

The replacement for APDS in tank guns (it is still used in small caliber cannon and HMGs) was APFSDS, which takes the design principles to their logical conclusion in producing the longest and thinnest practical projectile. The problem, as we have seen, is that achieving stability by spinning doesn't work with such long projectiles so they have to be fin stabilised. Modern manufacturing quality means that a high degree of accuracy can be achieved, and APFSDS seems likely to remain the supreme penetrator until conventional guns are replaced by different technologies.

Further information about high-velocity military AP ammunition, together with illustrations, is in The Search for High Velocity on this website.



SOURCES:

NRA Firearms Fact Book (3rd edition, 1989). A fascinating compendium of assorted data from the American National Rifle Association.

Handbook for Shooters and Reloaders by P. O. Ackley - a classic, which comes with a pack of charts and tables for do-it-yourself ballistics without formulae, let alone computer programmes.

Brassey's Military Ballistics, by Moss, Leeming and Farrar

...and decades of collecting odd snippets of information from all over the place.

Lainaa The Last "Big Lie" of Vietnam Kills U. S. Soldiers in Iraq

August 24th, 2004



At a Vietnam Special Forces base during 1964, I watched a U. S. soldier fire 15 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition into a tethered goat from an AR-15 rifle; moments after the last round hit, the goat fell over. Looking at the dead goat, I saw many little bullet entry-holes on one side; and when we turned him over, I saw many little bullet exit-holes on the other side. Over time, those observations were confirmed and reconfirmed, revealing that the stories we were told on the lethality of the .223 caliber cartridge were fabrications. Those false reports drove the adoption of the .223 caliber cartridge as the 5.56mm NATO cartridge and, ever since, Americans have been sent to war with a cartridge deficient in combat lethality; a deficiency that has recently caused the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

 

What is efficient combat lethality? The book Black Hawk Down quotes SFC Paul Howe's description of SFC Randy Shughart, a soldier who elected to carry the 7.62mm M-14 into the urban battlefield of Somalia in 1993 rather than the 5.56mm CAR-15 (M-16-variant):

 

"His rifle may have been heavier and comparatively awkward and delivered a mean recoil, but it damn sure knocked a man down with one bullet, and in combat, one shot was all you got. You shoot a guy, you want to see him go down; you don't want to be guessing for the next five hours whether you hit him, or whether he's still waiting for you in the weeds."  [1]

 

With the wisdom of a combat veteran, Howe describes the lethality necessary for a cartridge in combat—one-round knockdown power.

 

How did we get from military cartridges with proven one-round knockdown power such as the 30-06 and 7.62mm to the 5.56mm? The journey starts with the term "tumbling." This term has been associated with the .223 cal./5.56mm cartridge, since early in its marketing as a potential military cartridge to this day. The very word, tumbling, prompts images of a bullet traveling end over end through the human body in 360-degree loops: in reality, it does not move this way at all.

 

Dr. Martin L. Fackler, COL., USA (Ret.) served as a surgeon in Vietnam during 1968 and, subsequently, pursued the research of terminal ballistics by observing the effects of bullets fired into blocks of ballistic gelatin. In "Wounding patterns for military rifle bullets," he reports the observation that "all" non-deforming pointed bullets—this included the 30-06 and 7.62mm military full-metal jacket bullets—"yawed" 180 degrees while passing through the gelatin to exit base-forward; i.e., heaviest end forward. The 5.56mm projectile acted in the same manner with a very precise exception: These rounds "yawed" to 90-degrees, and then fragmented at their weakened serrated band (cannelure) into two or more pieces when fired into ballistic gelatin.  However, the 5.56mm projectile does NOT always yaw or fragment. Under field conditions, the probability of these effects is reduced by the following factors:

 

—The round strikes the target at less than 2700 feet per second. That velocity is reduced by: the farther the range to the target, the greater reduction in velocity; shortened weapon barrel length as is the case with the shorter M-4 carbine; and/or, manufacturing variances in the cartridge.

 

—Variances in human body thickness and flesh density and consistency.

 

In those cases, the bullet neither yaws nor fragments and causes only a pencil size hole through the body; i.e., small hole in, small hole out. Neither Dr. Fackler nor anyone else has provided any empirical data or estimate on the incidence of the 5.56mm yaw/fragmentation effect on enemy soldiers. Conversely, since first used by Americans in combat, there has been a consistent observation from the field—enemy soldiers continue to fire their weapons after being hit by multiple 5.56mm bullets; evidently, no yaw/fragmentation effect. Nevertheless, the term "tumble" was apparently derived from idealized yaw action and, as suggested by the following, was chosen in lieu of the word yaw because it would "sell" better.  [2]

 

The book, The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective by Edward C. Ezell and R. Blake Stevens, " . . . is, so far as [the authors] could make it so, the truth about the controversial 5.56mm caliber AR-15 (M16)—what it is, what it is not, where it came from, and why."

 

Edward C. Ezell, Ph.D., now deceased, was the Curator/Supervisor of the Division of Armed Forces History, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC and the editor of perhaps the world's most famous gun book, Small Arms of the World. The Black Rifle contains one of the earliest characterizations that the .223 cal. bullet tumbled in a brochure produced by Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, Inc. The caption written by the book's authors reads, "From the first Colt AR-15 brochure, produced in a desperate attempt to interest somebody – anybody – in the merits of the AR-15's 'unmatched superiority.'" In one of the three internal brochure illustrations is text reading, in part, "On impact the tumbling action of the .223 caliber ammunition increases effectiveness."  [3]

 

In 1961, Colt's did get somebody's attention. The Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DoD) was enjoined by the Kennedy Administration to explore how the United States could support a foreign ally in a "limited" war. In the spring of 1961, ARPA's Project AGILE was implemented to supply "research and engineering support for the military and paramilitary forces engaged in or threatened by conflict in remote areas of the world." In October of 1961, ARPA provided ten Colt's AR-15's to Vietnamese Forces in Saigon to conduct a limited test. The Black Rifle remarks of this test, "The number of rifles might have been small, but the enthusiastic reaction of the Vietnamese and their American advisors alike who handled and fired the AR-15s was just as [Colt's marketing agent] had predicted." Armed with these positive results, ARPA succeeded in expanding the Project AGILE study by procuring 1,000 AR-15s for distribution among select Vietnamese units for field-testing. Ezell & Stevens write that this approval resulted in " . . . saving Colt's from almost sure financial disaster and also setting the stage for the most influential yet controversial document so far in the history of the already controversial AR-15."  [4]

 

The purpose of this test, as set forth in, ARPA, "Report of Task 13A, Test of ArmaLite Rifle, AR-15," dated 31 July 1962, was " . . . a comparison between the AR-15 and the M2 Carbine to determine which is a more suitable replacement for shoulder weapons in selected units of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)." The Project AGILE results were summed up, in part, by ARPA as follows: "The suitability of the AR-15 as the basic shoulder weapon for the Vietnamese has been established. For the type of conflict now occurring in Vietnam, the weapon was also found by its users and by MAAG advisors to be superior in virtually all respects to the M1 Rifle, M1 and M2 Carbines, Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, and Browning Automatic Rifle." NOTE: This study and its recommendations concerned the suitability of the AR-15 for Vietnamese soldiers, who were described by the testers to be of "small stature, body configuration and light weight," NOT larger stature United States soldiers.  [5]

 

In any case, the report was widely read and some of its components came under serious question, especially those purporting to describe the demonstrated lethality of the .223 caliber cartridge. The following are three such examples from the Project AGILE report:

 

Example 1. "On 160900 June, one platoon from the 340 Ranger company was on a ground operation . . . and contacted 3 armed VC in heavily forested jungle.. . . At a distance of approximately 15 meters, one Ranger fired an AR-15 full automatic hitting one VC with 3 rounds with the first burst. One round in the head took it completely off. Another in the right arm, took it completely off. One round hit him in the right side, causing a hole about 5 inches in diameter.. . . (Rangers)"

 

Example 2. "On 9 June a Ranger Platoon from the 40th Infantry Regt. Was given the mission of ambushing an estimated VC Company.. . .

 

Number of VC killed: 5 [Descriptions of the one-round killing wounds follow.]

 

Back wound, which caused the thoracic cavity to explode. Stomach wound, which caused the abdominal cavity to explode. Buttock wound, which destroyed all tissue of both buttocks. Chest wound from right to left; destroyed the thoracic cavity. Heel wound; the projectile entered the bottom of the right foot causing the leg to split from the foot to the hip.

 

These deaths were inflicted by the AR-15 and all were instantaneous except the buttock wound. He lived approximately five minutes. (7th Infantry Division)"

 

Example 3. "On 13 April, a Special Forces team made a raid on a small village. In the raid, seven VC were killed. Two were killed by AR-15 fire. Range was 50 meters. One man was hit in the head; it looked like it exploded. A second man was hit in the chest, his back was one big hole. (VN Special Forces)" [6.]

 

The above "field-reports" are incredulous on their face and some in DoD requested that these results be duplicated scientifically. The Army Wound Ballistics Laboratory at Edgewood Arsenal attempted to do just that. Using .223 caliber Remington ammunition provided by Colt's representative, they conducted their "standard lethality trials that consisted of measuring the cavitational and other effects of firing at known distances into blocks of ballistic gelatin, and where necessary, anaesthetized goats." They failed to duplicate the explosive effects reported by Project AGILE. In November 1962, the Army initiated "Worldwide" tactical and technical tests of the AR-15 using U. S. soldiers. Edgewood was tasked to perform further lethality tests using modified .223 caliber ammunition. Ezell and Stevens describe the modifications: "They had modified some 55-grain .223 caliber ball bullets of Remington manufacture by cutting approximately 1/4 inch off the nose and drilling a 3/32-inch-diameter hole about 1/4 inch deep into the lead core of each bullet." The results? The authors continue, "As it turned out, even the hollow-points failed to duplicate anything like the spectacular effects recorded by the Vietnamese unit commanders and their American advisors, which had subsequently been taken as fact and much used as propaganda." [7.]

 

The .223 caliber cartridge was morphed into the 5.56mm NATO cartridge and adopted for the United States Service Rifle M-16 (formerly, AR-15) replacing the 7.62mm M-14. How could such propaganda have convinced the Department of Defense to adopt the .223 caliber cartridge? "All this was inspired by the principle—which is quite true in itself—that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper stata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods."      

                                                               Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf [ 8.]

 

As is usually the case, a judgment based on lies was to adversely affect those at the "pointy end of the spear." American warriors reported enemy soldiers continuing to close and fire their weapons after sustaining multiple hits by 5.56mm bullets. This happened as early as 9 December 1965 in the official "After Action Report of the Ia Drang Valley Operation . . .." popularized by the movie and book We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young. The commanding officer of the battalion engaged there, Col. Harold G. Moore, USA, writes of assaulting enemy soldiers being hit by 5.56mm rounds: "Even after being hit several times in the chest, many continued firing and moving for several more steps before dropping dead." [9.]

 

Later in that war, a similar experience is voiced by Col. John Hayworth, USA (Ret.): "In one fire-fight, I saw my RTO place three rounds [of 5.56 mm] in the chest of a charging NVA regular at 50 yards.  He kept firing his AK and never slowed down.  At 30 yards, I hit him with a blast of double ought buck.  It picked him up off his feet and he didn't get up again." [10.]

 

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the DoD increased the weight of the 5.56mm 55-grain bullet (M193) to 62-grains, replaced some of its lead core with a tungsten steel core, painted the bullet tip green and designated the new cartridge M855.  In 1991, the Pentagon sent its warriors to the Gulf War with this new green-tip cartridge. Maj. Howard Feldmeier, USMC (Ret.) was there: " . . . several Marines commented that they had to shoot Iraqi soldiers 2-3 or more times with the 62-grain 5.56mm green tip ammo before they stopped firing back at them . . .." That report is exemplified by one of an Iraqi officer who was thrown from his vehicle and set afire by an explosion:  "Somehow he managed to hold on to his AK-47.  He also got up, still on fire, faced the firing line of Marines and charged forward firing his weapon from the hip.  He didn't hit anyone but two Marines each nailed him with a three round burst from their M-16A2s.  One burst hit him immediately above his heart, the other in his belly button. [He] . . . kept right on charging and firing until his magazine was empty.  When he got up to the Marines two of them tackled him and rolled him in the sand to put out the fire. . . .  He was quickly carried back to the battalion aid station . . .. The surgeons told me he certainly died of burns, but not necessarily from the six 5.56mm wounds . . .." [ 11.]

 

In spite of the above "lesson learned," the DoD dispatched its warriors to combat in Somalia in 1993 with the same flawed "green tip" cartridge as testified in Mark Bowden's book Black Hawk Down: "His weapon was the most sophisticated infantry rifle in the world, a customized CAR-15, and he was shooting the army's new 5.56mm green tip round. . . .  The bullet made a small, clean hole, and unless it happened to hit the heart or spine, it wasn't enough to stop a man in his tracks. Howe felt he had to hit a guy five or six times just to get his attention."

 

The Pentagon remained unmoved by that experience of its warriors and continued to send them to war underpowered.  On 4 April 2002, I received an e-mail from a trooper in Afghanistan who appeals, in part: "The current-issue 62gr 5.56mm (223) round, especially when fired from the short-barreled, M-4 carbine, is proving itself (once again) to be woefully inadequate as [a] man stopper.  Engagements at all ranges are requiring multiple, solid hits to permanently bring down enemy soldiers.  Penetration is also sadly deficient.  Even light barriers are not perforated by this rifle/cartridge combination." [12.]

 

Additional observations of the impotence of the 5.56mm round soon appeared in official and professional publications. In their official briefing "Lessons Learned in Afghanistan" dated April 2002, LTC C. Dean, USA and SFC S. Newland, USA of the U. S. Army Natick Soldier Center reported: "Soldiers asked for a weapon with a larger round. 'So it will drop a man with one shot.'" In the October 2002 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette magazine, Capt Philip Treglia, USMC reflected on his Afghanistan experience in December 2001 by reporting that, "the 5.56 mm round will not put a man to the ground with two shots to the chest." Capt Treglia's men were trained to fire two bullets into an enemy's chest and if that did not knock him down, they were to shift fire to the head. This is the corrective action implemented for these Marines and many others in the Armed Forces for the impotent 5.56mm cartridge rather than equipping them with a rifle that fired a bullet with one-round knockdown power.  And, as Capt Treglia reported, multiple hits with the 5.56mm bullet didn't work any better in Afghanistan than it did anytime in the past.

 

In a 3 March 2003 written briefing, LCdr. Gary K. Roberts, USNR recommended to RAdm. Albert M. Calland, Commander, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command that he upgrades his command's 5.56mm weapons to the 6.8mm cartridge. That briefing, entitled, "Enhancement of NSW Carbine & Rifle Capability," opens by observing:

 

Recent combat operations have highlighted terminal performance problems, generally manifested as failures to rapidly incapacitate opponents, during combat operations when M855 62gr. "Green Tip" FMJ is fired from 5.56mm rifles and carbines. Failure to rapidly incapacitate armed opponents increases the risk of U.S. forces being injured or killed and jeopardizes mission success. [13.]

 

That statement was prophetic.

 

On 12 September 2003, in Ar Ramadi, Iraq elements of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group engaged enemy forces in a firefight. An insurgent was struck in the torso by several rounds of 5.56mm ammunition from their M-4 carbines (this is the current shortened version of the M-16 Service Rifle). He continued to fire his AK-47 and mortally wounded MSgt Kevin N. Morehead, age 33, from Little Rock, Arkansas. The engagement continued with the same insurgent surprising SFC William M. Bennett, age 35, from Seymour, Tennessee from a hiding place and killing him instantly with a three-round burst to the head and neck. SSgt Robert E Springer, threw away his M-4 carbine, drew an obsolete WWI/WWII vintage .45 caliber pistol and killed the insurgent with one shot. A close inspection of the enemy's corpse revealed that he had been hit by seven 5.56 mm rounds in his torso. Also, in this engagement, these soldiers were provided with a commercially produced 5.56mm round of 77-grain weight vice the 62-grain bullets in use by general-purpose forces. Obviously, the larger 5.56mm round was of little consequence. [14.]

 

These reports are consistent with my own experience during three tours of duty in Vietnam from the goat incident in 1964 described above to service with the 3rd Marine Division in 1968-69; experience that repeatedly reminded me that this 5.56mm cartridge was nothing more than the full-metal jacket military version of the commercial .223 caliber Remington cartridge. The .223 caliber Remington was and is today commercially advertised and sold as a "varmint cartridge" for hunting groundhogs, prairie dogs and woodchucks. The cartridge is offered with soft point, hollow point, fragmentation, or projectiles incorporating two or more of these attributes to enhance its lethality and assure a "clean kill": one-round knockdown power on varmints.  States such as the Commonwealth of Virginia do not permit it to be used for hunting deer or bear because its lethality—with or without those enhancements—does not assure a "clean kill" on big game. [15] Yet, its full metal jacket military counterpart continues to be issued to American warriors in spite of almost 40 years of Lessons Learned that enemy soldiers continue to fire their weapons and have even killed our soldiers after sustaining multiple hits from 5.56mm bullets.  

 

The lethality of the 5.56mm cartridge, sold on lies, cannot be fixed in truth. It is time the Department of Defense recognizes this "Big Lie" from the Vietnam War and in the names of MSgt Kevin N. Morehead and SFC William M. Bennett replaces this varmint cartridge with one that gives our warriors that critical capability described by SFC Paul Howe above—one-round knockdown power!

  The author's 25-year Marine career included service as an infantryman and intelligence officer with highlights of three tours of duty in Vietnam and, ultimately, representing the Defense Intelligence Agency as a briefer to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and other Washington area decision makers. He currently manages MILINET an Internet forum on international political/military affairs.  1. Bowden, M, Black Hawk Down, Penguin Books, 2000, p. 208.

 

 2. Fackler, ML,"Wounding patterns of military rifle bullets," International Defense Review, January 1989, pp. 59-64.

 

 3. Ezell, EC & Stevens, RB, The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective, Collector Grade Publications, Inc., 1994, p. 98.

 

 4. Ibid. pp.99-100.

 

 5. Ibid. pp.101-106.

 

 6. Ibid. pp. 106-107.

 

 7. Ibid. p. 116.

 

 8. Hitler, A, Mein Kampf. James Murphy, translator. London, New York, Melbourne: Hurst and Blackett Ltd; April 1942; page 134.

 

 9. Moore, Col. HG, "After Action Report, Ian Drang Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 14-16 November 1965," dated, 9 December 1965, p. 8.

 

10. Hayworth, Col. J, E-Mail to author, 23 April 2002.

 

11. Feldmeier, Maj. H, E-Mail to author, 21 May 2002.

 

12. Anonymous, E-Mail to MILINET, 26 March 2002.

 

13. Roberts, USNR, LCdr. Gary K., Brief to RAdm Albert M. Calland, CMDR NAVSPECWARCOM, "Enhancement of NSW Carbine & Rifle Capability" brief, 3 March 2003.

 

14. Jones, Bruce L., "MILINET: Case Studies in Combat Failures of 5.56mm Ammunition," 3 November 2003

 

15. http://www.dgif.state.va.us/hunting/regs/section6.html#legaluse

 

Maj. Anthony F. Milavic, USMC (Ret.)

Lainaa John Taylor was a legendary African game hunter who used many different cartridges on large, dangerous game. Lots of large, dangerous game. He would commonly go out of touch with western civilization for years at a time while hunting. He wrote books about the subject, including Pondoro (which means "lion" in the Chinyungwe language. I told you he was out in the sticks!), and African Rifles and Cartridges.

While he was out there, so lost that he wasn't aware that World War Two had started, he developed a simple cartridge rating system he called his Knockout Scale. Mr. Taylor was aware of the fact that game is killed by tissue destruction, resulting in blood loss, and that tissue destruction occurs through bullet penetration and expansion.

This scale generates a composite number which can be used to gauge a given cartridge's potential to stop a living, breathing animal. The scale does not assume that all kinetic energy can be transferred into a given target at any given time. It merely gives an idea of scale; what is appropriate for an animal of a given size. For instance, try these cartridges:



Handgun   



Bullet Weight (grains)   Velocity (fps) Caliber (inches)   TKO



.22 Long Rifle   38   1280   .224   1

9mm Parabellum (Luger) 124   1150   .355   7

.38 Special   158   800   .357   6

.357 Magnum   158   1225   .357   9

.40 Smith & Wesson   155   1150   .400   10

.44 Magnum   240   1180   .429   17

.45 ACP   230   850   .451   12

.454 Casull   300   1500   .454   29

.50 GI   300   725   .500   15

.50 Action Express   325   1400   .500   32

.500 S&W Magnum   440   1625   .500   51



Rifle   



Bullet Weight (grains)   Velocity (fps) Caliber (inches)   TKO



5.45x39mm Soviet 54   2950   .221   5



5.56x45mm NATO

(.223 Remington)   62   3100   .224   6



7.62x39mm Soviet 122   2330   .310   12



7.62x51mm NATO

(.308 Winchester)   147   2750   .308   18



.30-06 Springfield   180   2750   .308   21

.300 Winchester Magnum   190   3150   .308   26



.338 Lapua Magnum 250   2950   .338   35



.375 Holland & Holland   300   2530   .375   40

.416 Rigby   400   2420   .416   57

.470 Nitro Express   500   2150   .470   72

.50 BMG   660   2910   .510   139

.700 Nitro Express   1000   2000   .700   200



The TKO scale only takes damage from mechanical means into account. Relatively speaking, a cartridge with a TKO of 1 could kill a human being at close range, though most cartridges designed for self-defense have a TKO between 4 and 12. On the other end of the scale, a cartridge with a TKO of about 40 or above could incapacitate a charging elephant, depending on shot placement. The bigger cartridges almost gaurantee that such a large animal will be stopped in its tracks.

Since Shadowrun uses the Power Level of the "weapon" as the means for resolving armor penetration as well as determining damage, the result of the TKO scale helps us very little for determining a Power Level for real life cartridges. (In reality, the ability to penetrate armor and deliver a damaging effect have very little to do with each other.) However, it is an interesting way to compare the potential for damage between certain cartridges.

Lainaa US experience



1) The M-16 rifle : Thumbs down. Chronic jamming problems with the talcum

powder like sand over there. The sand is everywhere. [The Marine] says you feel

filthy 2 minutes after coming out of the shower. The M-4 carbine version is

more popular because it's lighter and shorter, but it has jamming problems

also. They like the ability to mount the various optical gunsights and

weapons lights on the picattiny rails, but the

weapon itself is not great in a desert environment. They all hate the 5.56mm

(.223) round. Poor penetration on the cinderblock structure common over

there and even torso hits cant be reliably counted on to put the enemy down.

Fun fact: Random autopsies on dead insurgents shows a high level of opiate

use.



2) The M243 SAW (squad assault weapon): .223 cal. Drum fed light machine

gun. Big thumbs down. Universally considered a piece of shit. Chronic

jamming problems, most of which require partial disassembly.

(that's fun in the middle of a firefight).



3) The M9 Beretta 9mm: Mixed bag. Good gun, performs well in desert

environment; but they all hate the 9mm cartridge. The use of handguns for

self-defense is actually fairly common. Same old story on the 9mm: Bad guys

hit multiple times and still in the fight.



4) Mossberg 12ga. Military shotgun: Works well, used frequently for clearing

houses to good effect.



5) The M240 Machine Gun: 7.62 Nato (.308) cal. belt fed machine gun,

developed to replace the old M-60 (what a beautiful weapon that was!!).

Thumbs up. Accurate, reliable, and the 7.62 round puts 'em down.

Originally developed as a vehicle mounted weapon, more and more are being

dismounted and taken into the field by infantry. The 7.62 round chews up the

structure over there.



6) The M2 .50 cal heavy machine gun: Thumbs way, way up. "Ma deuce" is still

worth her considerable weight in gold. The ultimate fight stopper, puts

their dicks in the dirt every time. The most coveted weapon in-theater.



7) The ..45 pistol: Thumbs up. Still the best pistol round out there.

Everybody authorized to carry a sidearm is trying to get their hands on one.

With few exceptions, can reliably be expected to put 'em down with a torso

hit. The special ops guys (who are doing most of the pistol work) use the HK

military model and supposedly love it. The old government model .45's are

being re-issued en masse.



8) The M-14: Thumbs up. They are being re-issued in bulk, mostly in a

modified version to special ops guys. Modifications include lightweight

Kevlar stocks and low power red dot or ACOG sights. Very reliable in the

sandy environment, and they love the 7.62 round.



9) The Barrett .50 cal sniper rifle: Thumbs way up. Spectacular range and

accuracy and hits like a freight train. Used frequently to take out vehicle

suicide bombers ( we actually stop a lot of them) and barricaded enemy.

Definitely here to stay.



10) The M24 sniper rifle: Thumbs up. Mostly in 308 but some in 300 win mag.

Heavily modified Remington 700's. Great performance. Snipers have been used

heavily to great effect. Rumor has it that a marine sniper on his third tour

in Anbar province has actually exceeded Carlos Hathcock's record for

confirmed kills with OVER 100.



11) The new body armor: Thumbs up. Relatively light at approx. 6 lbs. and

can reliably be expected to soak up small shrapnel and even will stop an

AK-47 round. The bad Hot as shit to wear, almost unbearable in the

summer heat (which averages over 120 degrees). Also, the enemy now goes for

head shots when ever possible. All the bullshit about the "old" body armor

making our guys vulnerable to the IED's was a non-starter. The IED

explosions are enormous and body armor doesn't make any difference at all in

most cases.



12) Night Vision and Infrared Equipment: Thumbs way up. Spectacular

performance. Our guys see in the dark and own the night, period. Very little

enemy action after evening prayers. More and more enemy being whacked at

night during movement by our hunter-killer teams. We've all seen the videos.



13) Lights: Thumbs up. Most of the weapon mounted and personal lights are

Surefire's, and the troops love 'em. Invaluable for night urban operations.

[The Marine] carried a $34 Surefire G2 on a neck lanyard and loved it.



I cant help but notice that most of the good fighting weapons and ordnance

are 50 or more years old!!!!!!!!! With all our technology, it's the WWII and

Vietnam era weapons that everybody wants!!!! The infantry fighting is frequent, up close and brutal. No quarter is given or shown.



Bad guy weapons:



1) Mostly AK47's The entire country is an arsenal. Works better in the

desert than the M16 and the .308 Russian round kills reliably. PKM belt fed

light machine guns are also common and effective. Luckily, the enemy mostly

shoots like shit. Undisciplined "spray and pray" type fire. However, they

are seeing more and more precision weapons, especially sniper rifles. (Iran,

again)



Fun fact: Captured enemy have apparently marveled at the marksmanship of our guys and how hard they fight. They are apparently told in Jihad school that the Americans rely solely on technology, and can be easily beaten in close quarters combat for their lack of toughness. Let's just say they know better now.



2) The RPG: Probably the infantry weapon most feared by our guys. Simple,

reliable and as common as dogshit. The enemy responded to our up-armored

humvees by aiming at the windshields, often at point blank range. Still

killing a lot of our guys.



3) The IED: The biggest killer of all. Can be anything from old Soviet

anti-armor mines to jury rigged artillery shells. A lot found in [The Marine's]

area were in abandoned cars. The enemy would take 2 or 3 155mm artillery

shells and wire them together. Most were detonated by cell phone, and the

explosions are enormous. You're not safe in any vehicle, even an M1 tank.

Driving is by far the most dangerous thing our guys do over there. Lately,

they are much more sophisticated "shape charges" (Iran ian) specifically

designed to penetrate armor.



Fact: Most of the ready made IED's are supplied by Iran, who is also providing terrorists (Hezbollah types) to train the insurgents in their use and tactics. That's why the attacks have been so deadly lately. Their concealment methods are ingenious, the latest being shape charges in Styrofoam containers spray painted to look like the cinderblocks that litter all Iraqi roads. We find about 40% before they detonate, and the bomb disposal guys are unsung heroes of this war.



4) Mortars and rockets: Very prevalent. The soviet era 122mm rockets (with

an 18km range) are becoming more prevalent. One of [The Marine's] NCO's lost a leg

to one. These weapons cause a lot of damage "inside the wire". [The Marine's] base

was hit almost daily his entire time there by mortar and rocket fire, often

at night to disrupt sleep patterns and cause fatigue (It did). More of a

psychological weapon than anything else. The enemy mortar teams would jump

out of vehicles, fire a few rounds, and then haul ass in a matter of

seconds.



5) Bad guy technology: Simple yet effective. Most communication is by cell

and satellite phones, and also by email on laptops. They use handheld GPS

units for navigation and "Google earth" for overhead views of our positions.

Their weapons are good, if not fancy, and prevalent.



Their explosives and bomb technology is TOP OF THE LINE. Night vision is

rare. They are very careless with their equipment and the captured GPS units

and laptops are treasure troves of Intel when captured.



Who are the bad guys?:



Most of the carnage is caused by the Zarqawi Al Qaeda group. They operate

mostly in Anbar province (Fallujah and Ramadi). These are mostly

"foreigners", non-Iraqi Sunni Arab Jihadists from all over the Muslim world

(and Europe). Most enter Iraq through Syria (with, of course, the knowledge

and complicity of the Syrian govt.) , and then travel down the "rat line"

which is the trail of towns along the Euphrates River that we've been

hitting hard for the last few months.



Some are virtually untrained young Jihadists that often end up as suicide

bombers or in "sacrifice squads". Most, however, are hard core terrorists

from all the usual suspects (Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas etc.) These are the

guys running around murdering civilians en masse and cutting heads off. The

Chechens (many of whom are Caucasian), are supposedly the most ruthless and

the best fighters. (they have been fighting the Russians for years). In the

Baghdad area and south, most of the insurgents are Iranian inspired (and

led) Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian Shiia have been very adept at infiltrating

the Iraqi local govt.'s, the police forces and the Army. The have had a

massive spy and agitator network there since the Iran-Iraq war in the early

80's. Most of the Saddam loyalists were killed, captured or gave up long

ago.



Bad Guy Tactics:



When they are engaged on an infantry level they get their asses kicked every

time. Brave, but stupid. Suicidal Banzai-type charges were very common

earlier in the war and still occur. They will literally sacrifice 8-10 man

teams in suicide squads by sending them screaming and firing Ak's and RPG's

directly at our bases just to probe the defenses.



They get mowed down like grass every time. ( see the M2 and M240 above).

[The Marine's] base was hit like this often. When engaged, they have a tendency to

flee to the same building, probably for what they think will be a glorious

last stand. Instead, we call in air and that's the end of that more often

than not. These hole-ups are referred to as Alpha Whiskey Romeo's (Allah's

Waiting Room). We have the laser guided ground-air thing down to a science.

The fast mover's, mostly Marine F-18's, are taking an ever incr easing toll

on the enemy. When caught out in the open, the helicopter gunships and

AC-130 Spectre gunships cut them to ribbons with cannon and rocket fire,

especially at night.



Interestingly, artillery is hardly used at all.



Fun fact: The enemy death toll is supposedly between 45-50 thousand. That is why we're seeing less and less infantry attacks and more IED, suicide bomber shit.



The new strategy is simple: attrition.



The insurgent tactic most frustrating is their use of civilian non-combatants as cover. They know we do all we can to avoid civilian casualties and therefore schools, hospitals and (especially) Mosques are locations where they meet, stage for attacks, cache weapons and ammo and flee to when engaged. They have absolutely no regard whatsoever for civilian casualties. They will terrorize locals and murder without hesitation anyone believed to be sympathetic to the Americans or the new Iraqi govt. Kidnapping of family members (especially children) is common to influence people they are trying to influence but cant reach, such as local govt. officials, clerics, tribal leaders, etc.).



The first thing our guys are told is "don't get captured". They know that if

captured they will be tortured and beheaded on the internet. Zarqawi openly

offers bounties for anyone who brings him a live American serviceman. This

motivates the criminal element who otherwise don't give a shit about the

war. A lot of the beheading victims were actually kidnapped by common

criminals and sold to Zarqawi. As such, for our guys, every fight is to the

death. Surrender is not an option.



The Iraqi's are a mixed bag. Some fight well, others aren't worth a shit.

Most do okay with American support. Finding leaders is hard, but they are

getting better. It is widely viewed that Zarqawi's use of suicide bombers,

en masse, against the civilian population was a serious tactical mistake.

Many Iraqi's were galvanized and the caliber of recruits in the Army and the

police forces went up, along with their motivation. It also led to an exponential increase in good intel because the Iraqi's are sick of the insurgent attacks against civilians.



The Kurds are solidly pro-American and fearless fighters.



According to [The Marine], morale among our guys is very high. They not only

believe they are winning, but that they are winning decisively. They are

stunned and dismayed by what they see in the American press, whom they

almost universally view as against them. The embedded reporters are despised

and distrusted. They are inflicting casualties at a rate of 20-1 and then see shit like "Are we losing in Iraq" on TV and the print media. For the most part, they are satisfied with their equipment, food and leadership.



Bottom line though, and they all say this, there are not enough guys there

to drive the final stake through the heart of the insurgency, primarily because there aren't enough troops in-theater to shut down the borders with Iran and Syria. The Iranians and the Syrians just cant stand the thought of Iraq being an American ally (with, of course, permanent US bases there).

Lainaus käyttäjältä: MJ
The point is not show that 5,56 NATO is a lousy caliber nor round, but that there are many much better existing old calibers and rounds. Personally I like 5,56 NATO as it's a nice little round and there's still a lot of potential with it. Nevertheless 7,62 NATO has even more potential and by all means it's better than "little bro 5,56 NATO"

Lainaa On 28 October 1980, after more than four years of extensive testing at the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Federal Republic of Germany, the NATO Small Arms Test Control Commission (NSMATCC) appoved the standardization of a second rifle caliber cartridge. The cartidge selected was the intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm (.223 Caliber) and the improved Belgian version, the SS109, was selected as the basis for standardization. As a result, NATO now has two standard rifle caliber cartridges, the full power 7.62 x 51mm NATO (.308 Caliber), in service since 1953, and the new intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm NATO adopted in 1980.

Lainaa The current production 7.62 x 51mm NATO ball cartridge has remained unchanged since its adoption by NATO in 1953. As typified by the U. S. M80 ball and the Belgian M77 ball, this cartridge propels a 147-grain cupronickel-jacketed lead bullet at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (848 mps). Total cartridge length and weight are 2.80 inches and 386 grains, respectively. Utilizing a standard 22-inch barrel with a rifling twist of one turn in twelve inches (M14 rifle), the maximum effective range of the 7.62 x 51mm ball cartridge is listed as 620 meters (682 yds). The U. S. M80 and the Belgian M77 ball projectiles can penetrate the standard NATO 3.45 mm (.14 inch) thick steel plate up to a range of 620 meters, and can penetrate one side of the U. S. steel helmet up to a range of 800 meters (880 yds). In barrier and fortification penetration tests, the 147 grain ball projectile can consistently penetrate two test building blocks. The SS109 5.56mm NATO cartridge is a second generation intermediate power round developed with 1970's technology. It is significantly more powerful and effective than the U. S. M193 5.56mm ball round originally used with the M16 rifle. The new SS109 cartridge propels a heavier 62-grain semiarmor piercing projectile at an initial velocity of 3,050 fps (924 mps). The improved projectile contains a 10-grain .182 caliber hardened steel penetrator that ensures penetration at longer ranges. Total cartridge length and weight are 2.26 inches and 182.0 grains, respectively. The increased length and weight of the new SS109 projectile requires a faster rifling twist of one turn in seven inches to fully stabilize the new projectile in flight. The predecessor M193 5.56mm, which used a projectile weighting only 55 grains, was only marginally stabilized with a slower rifling twist of one turn in twelve inches. The new projectile can penetrate the standard NATO 3.45mm steel plate up to a range of 640 meters (704 yds) and one side of the U. S. steel helmet up to a range of 1,300 meters (1430 yds). In tests of barrier and fortification penetration however, the steel penetrator of the SS109 could not pierce any of the test building blocks.

Lainaa The penetration results obtained by the NSMATCC with the 5.56mm SS109 cartridge are impressive. The SS109 can penetrate the 3.45mm standard NATO steel plate to 640 meters, while the 7.62mm ball can only penetrate it to 620 meters. The U. S. steel helmet penetration results are even more impressive as the SS109 can penetrate it up to 1,300 meters, while the 7.62mm ball cannot penetrate it beyond 800 meters. These comparisons however, do not consider the fact that the SS109 uses a semi-armor piercing, steel-cored projectile, while the 7.62mm ball uses a relatively soft anti-personnel, lead-cored projectile. A semi-armor piercing 7.62mm caliber projectile, using second generation technology as the SS109, would easily out-perform the smaller SS109 projectile in penetration tests at all ranges. With respect to barrier and fortification penetration tests, the 7.62mm ball projectile can consistently penetrate two test building blocks, while the SS109 semi-armor piercing projectile cannot penetrate a single block. In light of these considerations, the idea of SS109 penetration superiority over the 7.62 x 51mm is not valid.

Lainaa Läpäisy perusteräspotta (US-malli) ja perusteräslevy (NATO) 500 m.

5,56 mm NATO kaliiperin kuula (62 gr FMJBT SS109) selvittää 500 m haasteen.

7,62 mm NATO kaliiperin kuula (155 gr HPBT) selvittää 500 m haasteen.

.338 LM kaliiperin kuula (250 gr HPBT) selvittää 500 m haasteen.



Läpäisy perusteräspotta (US-malli) ja perusteräslevy (NATO) 1000 m. HUOM! Määräävä vaikutus etäisyys.

5,56 mm NATO kaliiperin kuula (62 gr FMJBT SS109) selvittää 1000 m haasteen kypärän osalta, muttei teräslevyn.

7,62 mm NATO kaliiperin kuula (155 gr HPBT) selvittää 1000 m haasteen kypärän osalta, muttei teräslevyn osalta muutoin kuin tuurilla.

.338 LM kaliiperin kuula (250 gr HPBT) selvittää 1000 m haasteen kaikilta osin.



Joulet 1000 metrissä. Entäpä Juoliraja; kompromissina vaikkapa tasan 500 Joulea 1000 metrissä. Ainoastaan .338 LM (noin 2000 + Joulea per 1000 m) ja 7,62 NATO (noin 550 + Joulea per 1000 m) läpäisevät tämän parametrin. 5,56 mm NATO (noin 260 + Joulea per 1000 m ja niukasti siinä ja siinä rajoilla onko ylisoninen vaiko alisoninen, todennäköisesti jo alisoninen kuula eli alta 330 m/s per 1000 m).



Jotta kaikki esim. patruunat läpäisivät tämän kohdan Joulitehot olisi määriteltävä 250 Jouleen 1000 metrissä ja samoin sallittava se, että luoti on jo 1000 metrissä alisoninen.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: JRTervehdys



Kommenttini ei ehkä ihan vastaa topicia,mutta tuli mieleen pari vuotta sitten tapahtunut metsästys onnettomuus,jossa kaveri ampu teertä latvaan

(en muista osuko) .308 ja 8g kokovaippa.



ampujan velipoika kuoli nuotiolle siihen luotiin.



Tutkinnassa kartalta mitattu matka yli 3 kilometriä.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: laurHJu wrote:

"Poliisikäytössä 5.56:n parhaita etuja on että se ei läpäise kovinkaan hyvin edes FMJ-muodossa kiinteitä rakenteita kuten väliseiniä, ovia jne. Läpäisee toki mutta ei sen jälkeen lennä 150m ja tapa siellä. Menee yleensä väliseinästä läpi mutta sirpaloituu ja vaarallinen kantama lasketaan seinänä läpäisyn jälkeen metreissä eikä edes kymmenissä metreissä."



Here is good article about 5,56x45 penetration (better to say non-penetration) tests.

"Detailed Information Regrading Penetraition Of .223 Ammunition"

http://www.olyarms.com/?page=223articles

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SO

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SOPaljonkohan tarvitsisi laittaa suojalevyyn paksuutta tuota kaatuvaa maalilaitetta ajatellen? Materiaali taitaa olla ihan "viiskakkosta" rautaa mitä hyllyssä on.

10mm, 20mm ?

 :wink:

Itse itselleni vastaten:

Empiirisissä testeissä on osoittautunut että 10mm levy (SFS Fe 52) riittää suojaamaan maalilaitteen mikäli käytössä on 7.62 Ball L2A2 (RG NATO) 9,3g v0=830m/s bc.=0.379 luodilta 50m lähtien; suojalevyyn jää pysyviä muodonmuutoksia, mutta maalilaitteeseen ei.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: IKoPitänee ottaa selvää...

Lainaus käyttäjältä: SO
yms. sniper neutralization systeemit niin vastapuolen "lehti"koneisto kertoo legendaa ja on onnistunut luomaan tarinan "Juba - Baghdad sniper" tarkka-ampujasta joka (siis tarinan mukaan) on aiheuttanut menetyksiä maailman ehkä varustelluimmalle ja parhaana pidetylle armeijalle tämän hetkisellä sotatanterella vaikkakin käynnissä on ainoastaan käsittääkseni terrorisminvastainen operaatio. Lukuja on esitetty "154 GIs killed, 54 GIs wounded, 6 Officers killed, and 4 Snipers killed" tosin jossakin oli maininta myös että tämä "juba" olisi saatettu maan lepoon.

LainaaYmmärtääkseni SS109 on yhtä erva kuin vaikkapa 7.62x39 itäsaksan ylijäämäkin jossa räkärautainen tappi on kuulan sisällä ainoastaan kustannussyistä täytteenä.

LainaaAlun alkaenkaan ei siis läpäisyä varten vaikka se mukavasti sitäkin ominaisuutta parantaa.

LainaaSiksi mielestäni kuula on puhuttelunimeltään "Semi AP", ei sitä alkujakaan tehty varsinaiseksi AP -patiksi vaan ihan stanu tusinapaukuksi demokratian levittämistarkoituksiin.

LainaaSattuupahan nyt vaan lävistämään kivasti "kaupan päälle".

Lainaus käyttäjältä: IKo


Suuri nopeus ja kovaksi karkaistu metallipenetraattori vähemmän yllättävästi läpäisee kovia materiaaleja kohtuullisesti.



Pitänee ottaa selvää...

Lainaus käyttäjältä: HJu
Uskoisin maallikkona että aivan huvikseen ei FN tai USAn sotavoimat ole sitä teräskärkeä sinne luodin sisään ole lisänneet eikä varsinkaan karkaistuna.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: HJu

Eli hyvä lisä mutta ei varmaankaan mikään kaikkivoipa ratkaisu mielestäni.

Lainaus käyttäjältä: PLPitikö meikäläisten mennä hylkäämään takavuosina Aimo Lahden mainiot 20mm PST-kiväärit ?