Hyvää huomenta!
I was just surfing stratfor.com and found article about Iraq. Snipers were mentioned, so maybe someone is interested.
Iraq: An Adaptive Enemy in Anbar Province
Aug 03, 2005
Summary
On Aug. 3, U.S. Central Command reported that 14 Marines and a civilian interpreter died when an improvised explosive device hit their amphibious assault vehicle in the Iraqi town of Al Hadithah near the Syrian border. The attack is the latest in the intensifying combat between U.S. forces and insurgents in western Iraq's Anbar province, and is indicative of more sophisticated -- and effective -- insurgent tactics.
Analysis
The Aug. 3 attack on a U.S. Marine patrol with an improvised explosive device (IED) in the Iraqi town of Al Hadithah near the Syrian border was the latest in an escalating series of insurgent attacks against U.S. forces. It was also one of the deadliest, killing 14 Marines assigned to the 2nd Marine Division's Regimental Combat Team 2 and an Iraqi civilian interpreter. Since July 25, 36 U.S. troops have been killed in combat with enemy forces, a dramatic increase over previous weeks. Recovering from a series of U.S.-led offensive operations in their stronghold of Anbar province in the spring and early summer, the insurgents are now lashing out against their enemy.
On Aug. 1, six Marine snipers were killed about a mile outside of Al Hadithah. The snipers were moving in two three-man teams when they were surrounded by insurgents and engaged with small-arms fire. Five Marines were killed in the initial attack and one was unaccounted for; his body was later found and recovered a few kilometers away.
This particular engagement was unusual in that the insurgents were able to ambush the snipers with direct fire instead of their preferred tactic of using indirect fire -- mortars, roadside bombs -- to attack U.S. forces. In most cases, insurgents fare poorly in a street fight against well-armed and well-trained U.S. troops. Marine snipers are among the best trained and equipped U.S. troops, and normally would have few problems in a fight with jihadist insurgents. However, by the nature of their mission, snipers are usually outnumbered, separated from the main force (though in contact with it) and vulnerable when caught in the open. The fact that the jihadists were able to get the drop on the Marines indicates the insurgents are increasing their tactical skill and their ability to take the initiative against U.S. forces.
In a posting on an Islamist Web site Aug. 1, the Iraqi jihadist group Ansar al Sunna claimed credit for ambushing the Marine snipers. Later on Aug. 1, masked men claiming to be members of the group were seen in Al Hadithah's central marketplace passing out fliers detailing their victory. The jihadists also displayed Marine equipment, including weapons, helmets and body armor, which means insurgents in the area may well possess a handful of state-of-the-art Marine sniper rifles.
On July 31, insurgents occupying a schoolhouse rigged with explosives and fortified with .30 caliber machine guns in the windows attacked Marines from Regimental Combat Team 2 during a cordon-and-search operation in Al Hadithah with mortar fire. M1A1 Abrams tanks and coalition aircraft engaged the insurgents in the building. In the course of the assault, coalition forces on the scene observed secondary explosions that were larger than the bombs dropped from the aircraft, indicating that the school was being used as a munitions cache. There were no civilian casualties reported during the engagement, but several insurgents were confirmed killed.
The Marines killed in the IED attack Aug. 3, as well as the snipers killed in the Aug. 1 ambush, all belonged to the 25th Marine Regiment's 3rd Battalion, a reserve unit from Ohio. "Three/25" has been involved in combat operations all over Anbar province, taking part in numerous operations against insurgents such as Operation Saif (Sword) in June 2005. On June 9, the battalion lost three Marines in one day when a roadside bomb hit their vehicle during combat operations near Haqlaniya.
In recent weeks, attacks on U.S. forces in Anbar province and Baghdad have increased, with the insurgents -- who usually come out on the short end of any direct engagement with U.S. forces -- scoring some victories. Anbar province, the frequent scene of U.S.-led offensive operations, has continued to be a bitter battleground, with U.S. forces taking casualties almost daily there. Since the beginning of July there have been at least 11 major attacks against U.S. or Iraqi forces using roadside bombs, suicide bombers, mortars and small arms.
In the past two years, as U.S. forces countered initial IED attacks with improvised armor on their vehicles and later with add-on armor kits, the insurgents have been deploying larger and more sophisticated IEDs. Improvements in concealment and detonation tactics were followed by the introduction of shaped charges, which concentrate the energy of the blast and cause more damage to the target.
In the spring and early summer, the Marines, supported by other U.S troops and airpower, conducted a series of offensive operations in Anbar province designed to disrupt the insurgents' lines of supply and communication. During these operations, intense fighting occurred in the initial phases as the Marines entered the insurgent sanctuaries. However, the most recent attacks in Al Hadithah and elsewhere in Anbar province were not in response to a large U.S.-led offensive operation but were simply a robust insurgent response to the presence of U.S. troops in their area.
The insurgents are also escalating their campaign against U.S. forces in Baghdad. In July, there were 17 major attacks directed at U.S. forces in the capital using car bombs, suicide bombers and small-arms fire. There were nine major attacks in June. On Aug. 3, U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, a Pentagon spokesman, attributed the increased activity to the pressure being exerted on the insurgents by simultaneous operations against them in various parts of the country. With operations occurring at the same time in many places, the insurgents cannot move to another area without encountering U.S. or Iraqi forces.
In light of the recent surge of insurgent activity in Al Hadithah, it is very likely the U.S. will soon mount another major operation in Anbar province to eradicate enemy strongholds along the road from Baghdad to the Syrian border. Whether this strategy will achieve stability and security in this seething province is another matter. As Gen. Ham also noted Aug. 3, the Iraqi insurgents are an adaptive enemy.
Hi Laur,
Thanks for posting that info. I quess the game is getting more more rough in Iraq, that's very unfortunate and sad.
Furthermore, I'll suspect that we'll see more and more terrorist attacks (bombs), like Madrid and London, in Europe too. That's very unfortunate and disturbing trend. Many Europeans have also lost their friends, relatives, business associates etc... in terrorist attacks both in USA, Europe and Egypt. A few of my former business associates also died in NY 9/11 attack.
I do hope that the war against terrorisms will be successful and finally end all the attacks and senseless violence.
Carpe Diem,
MJ
MJ wrote
"Thanks for posting that info. I quess the game is getting more more rough in Iraq, that's very unfortunate and sad. "
I would not to be so pessimistic, if we follow stratfor.com thinking-reasoning line. Here are two more (and last sotries, i'm violating copyright already :) stories. To protect my back I suggest you to subscribe to stratfor. Sorry, moderators, for advertaisement :(
Al Qaeda's Global Campaign: Tet Offensive or Battle of the Bulge?
Jul 26, 2005
By George Friedman
A spate of attacks have occurred recently that we attribute to al Qaeda. In addition to the two rounds of attacks in London this month and the bombings at Sharm el Sheikh, we have seen ongoing suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Iraq that targeted government officials, the bombing of a Sufi shrine in Islamabad, the abduction and murder of an Iranian security official and other killings in the Muslim world. In addition, we have seen an intensification of attacks in Iraq by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al Qaeda-linked faction. We are not great believers in coincidence and therefore regard these incidents as being coordinated. The degree of coordination and the method whereby coordination is achieved is murky, and not really material. But that we are experiencing an offensive by al Qaeda is clear.
At issue is the nature of the offensive. To put the matter simply, do these attacks indicate the ongoing, undiminished strength of al Qaeda, or do they represent a final, desperate counterattack -- both within Iraq and globally -- to attempt to reverse al Qaeda's fortunes? In our view, the latter is the case. Al Qaeda, having been hammered over the past four years, and al-Zarqawi, facing the defection of large segments of his Sunni base of support, are engaged in a desperate attempt to reverse the course of the war. It is not clear that they will fail; such counter-offensives have succeeded in recent years. The question is whether this is a Tet offensive or a Battle of the Bulge.
To begin to answer that, we need to consider these two offensives.
In warfare, as one side is being pressed to the point of no return, the classic maneuver is to marshal all available strength for an offensive designed to turn the tide. The offensive has a high probability of military failure and, therefore, would not be attempted until military defeat or an unacceptable political outcome appeared inevitable. The goal is to inflict a blow so striking that it throws the other side off balance. More important, it should create a crisis of confidence in the enemy's command structure and its political base. It should be a surprise attack, causing commanders to question their intelligence organizations' appreciation of the other side's condition. It should have a significant military impact. Above all, it should redefine the enemy public's perception of the course of the war. Ideally, it should set the stage for a military victory -- but more probably, it would set the stage for a political settlement.
In December 1944, the Germans understood they were going to be defeated by the spring of 1945, when Soviet and Anglo-American forces would simultaneously smash into Germany. They gathered what force they had to attempt a surprise counterattack. Anglo-American intelligence organizations had concluded that the Germans were finished. The Germans took advantage of this by striking through the Ardennes forest. Their goal was the port of Antwerp.
The fall of Antwerp -- or at least, the ability to interfere with access to the port -- would not have defeated the Allies. However, it would have constrained Allied offensive operations and forced postponement of the spring offensive. It also would have shaken the confidence in the Allied high command and both Roosevelt and Churchill. The unexpected nature of the offensive would have created a political crisis and opened the door to either a redefinition of Allied war aims or, possibly, a separate peace in the West.
From a military standpoint, the attack was a long shot, but not a preposterous one. Had the Germans crossed the Meuse River, they could have approached Antwerp at least. In the event, if we consider the panic that gripped the Allied high command even without the Germans reaching the Meuse, their crossing of it would have had massive repercussions. Whether it would have had political consequences is unclear. As it was, the offensive failed in the first days. It was liquidated in a matter of weeks, and the war concluded catastrophically for Germany.
A more successful example of a terminal offensive was the North Vietnamese offensive in February 1968. The Johnson administration had been arguing, with some logic, that the North Vietnamese forces were being worn down effectively by the United States, and that they were on the defensive and declining. The Tet offensive was intended to reverse the waning fortunes of the North Vietnamese. There were a number of goals. First and foremost, the offensive was designed to demonstrate to all parties that the North Vietnamese retained a massive offensive capability. It was intended to drive a wedge between U.S. commanders in Saigon and the political leaders in Washington by demonstrating that the Saigon command was providing misleading analysis. Finally, it was intended to drive a wedge between the Johnson administration and the American public.
From a strictly military standpoint, Tet was a complete disaster. It squandered scarce resources on an offensive that neither reduced U.S. strength nor gained and held strategic objectives. After the offensive was over, the North Vietnamese army was back where it had started, with far fewer troops or supplies.
From the political point of view, however, it was wildly successful. A chasm opened between the civilian leadership in Washington and Gen. William Westmoreland in Saigon. Westmoreland's rejection of intelligence analyses pointing to an offensive undermined confidence in him. Far more important, Johnson's speeches about lights at the end of the tunnel lost all credibility, in spite of the fact that he wasn't altogether wrong. The apparent success of the Tet offensive forced a re-evaluation of American strategy in Vietnam, Johnson's decision not to stand for re-election and a general sense that the U.S. government had vastly underestimated the strength and tenacity of the North Vietnamese.
Declining military fortunes force combatants to consider political solutions. At that point, military action becomes focused on three things:
1. Demonstrating to all concerned that you retain effective offensive capabilities.
2. Convincing the enemy that a military solution is impossible.
3. Creating a political atmosphere in which negotiations and/or military victory are possible.
In their Ardennes offensive in 1944, the Germans failed in the first goal and therefore could not achieve the others. In the case of the Tet offensive, Americans became convinced that the North Vietnamese could still mount offensives, could not be defeated and therefore had to be negotiated with. The negotiations and truce bought the North Vietnamese time to regroup, reinforce and bring the war to a satisfactory solution (from their standpoint).
Vietnam's guerrilla warfare bears little resemblance to the massed, combined arms conflict in World War II. Neither even slightly reflects the global covert offensive mounted by al Qaeda, nor the asymmetric response of the United States. Nevertheless, all wars share common characteristics:
1. A political object -- for example, domination of Europe, unification of Vietnam, creation of radical Islamist states in the Muslim world.
2. All use the military means at hand to achieve these goals.
3. In all wars, one side or the other reaches a point beyond which there is only defeat. That point calls for the final offensive to be launched.
4. The offensive is not hopeless, but its ends are primarily political rather than military. Its goal is to redefine the enemy's psychology as well as bolster the spirits of one's own forces.
The key to success, at that point, is two-fold. First, the offensive must appear to be an ongoing operation. It cannot appear to be a hastily contrived, desperation move. The Germans didn't succeed in this at the Battle of the Bulge. The North Vietnamese did at Tet. Second, the offensive must have the desired psychological effect: It must reverse the enemy's expectation of victory. The claims by civil and military leaders on the other side that the war is under control must be discredited.
It has been our view for months that the United States is winning -- not has won -- the U.S.-jihadist war. Events in the recent past have reinforced our view. In Iraq, for example, the decision by a large segment of the Sunni leadership to join in the political process has posed a mortal challenge to the jihadists. They depend on the Sunni community to provide sanctuary, recruits and supplies. If any large segment of the Sunni community abandons them, their ability to wage war -- on the scale it is currently being waged -- is undermined. They will, however, be able to sustain a much smaller and less politically significant scale of operations.
In the broader, global fight, al Qaeda continues to face this reality. There has not been a single revolution overthrowing a Muslim government in favor of a radical/militant Islamist regime. In fact, the bulk of the Muslim states are actively cooperating with the United States. The primary intent of the radical and militant Islamists, which is to create a caliphate based on at least one significant Muslim state, has been completely thwarted. This point has not been missed in the Islamic world.
At this point, al Qaeda needs to launch a counteroffensive on a global scale that is designed to demonstrate its viability as a paramilitary force. People tend to denigrate the complexity of terrorist operations. The complexity is not in the willingness to blow oneself up, however -- the complexity is in acquiring explosives, transmitting messages internationally and generally going undetected. The 9-11 attacks were a superbly executed operation. Al Qaeda has set a standard of credibility for itself, and to create the reversal of fortunes it requires, it must carry out an operation on that order.
Yet since the Sept. 11 attacks, the scale of al Qaeda's operations outside the Islamic world has declined. Al Qaeda badly needs to re-establish its credibility and recapture its earlier momentum by mounting an attack on the scale of 9-11 or beyond. There is not only no need to delay, but every incentive to move as quickly as possible. They need this for political reasons, but also because the pressure from national intelligence agencies is such that to wait is to risk losing the operational team (if one is ready to strike). If they have a nuclear weapon, for example, the longer they wait to use it, the more likely it is to be captured in transit to its target. The pressure is on for al Qaeda to act as quickly and as effectively as it can.
The London attacks were a failure. It's not only that the Tube attacks lacked the ferocity of 9-11. However tragic the loss of life, the first attack was a work of mediocre effectiveness, while the 7/21 attempt was a joke. The attacks elsewhere, particularly at Sharm el Sheikh, were more effective, but still didn't rise to the levels required to establish credibility.
What al Qaeda has demonstrated is that its available assets, particularly outside the Islamic world, lack the skill and sophistication to even come close to the level of the Madrid attacks, let alone those in New York. Their attempt to increase the tempo of operations has led them to use untrained and unsuitable personnel. They have not achieved the psychological ends they wish.
Al Qaeda has one hope. If the ability to mount modest terrorist operations with increased frequency convinces its enemies that it is more viable than was thought, at that point they will begin to be successful. That perception will transfer to the Muslim world and with that, al Qaeda could recover the credibility it needs to continue to wage war. At the moment, however, that doesn't seem to be happening. The major political result of London, for example, has been a tendency among Muslim leaders to condemn the attacks in numbers and vehemence rarely seen before. Al Qaeda's glory days seem to be behind it.
Which means that al Qaeda must up the ante if they can. We do not believe they will be able to do so. More precisely, if they had the ability, there have been so many other moments to have acted, it seems odd that they didn't. We also doubt that they have recently acquired the means to attack. They are under heavy pressure, and it is harder for them to grow than it was before. There are al Qaeda sympathizers, but al Qaeda has maintained its internal security by not growing. They are relying on untrained sympathizers to carry out missions. It is hard to believe that they have much left in their kit.
Still, the outcome of any last-ditch offensive is uncertain. The very fact that it is happening can panic enemy forces or drive a wedge between the government and military, and between government and the public. Bush's popularity is slipping, and the perception that al Qaeda is waging a successful and unstoppable offensive could suddenly undermine his position. He is vulnerable at the moment. But thus far, the attempt at a global Tet offensive has failed to rise to the level of credibility required. Al Qaeda must do something of substantial significance before the summer ends, or see its position in Iraq and in other places deteriorate rapidly.
As with the Germans and Vietnamese, al Qaeda's time of mortal crisis is their time of maximum available effort. We doubt that they can pull this off, but we will wait until September to see.
Al Qaeda as Warfighting Entity
Aug 02, 2005
By George Friedman
In recent weeks, we have been trying to analyze the state of the U.S.-jihadist war, touching on subjects ranging from the decision -- announced this past week -- to begin reducing U.S. troops in Iraq to the idea that we are in the midst of a surge of jihadist attacks, intended to reshape the course of the war.
As often happens, our readers -- mostly non-subscribers, we would note -- have lambasted us. Critics of the war have accused us of pimping for the Bush administration for daring to imply that the war was anything but a total and catastrophic failure. Supporters of the war wrote to condemn us for even imagining that al Qaeda might consist of people who actually think and plan things, rather than of raving psychotics seeking slaughter because they feel like it. One e-mail said the war is the result of George W. Bush's unresolved Oedipal conflicts. Another said that we were naïve in assuming that all Muslims were not deranged killers. Discussions of the war have never been elevated, but they have now degenerated to a Warner Brother's cartoon -- with Sylvester, Tweety, Elmer and Bugs all cranked up on speed and self-righteousness.
In the midst of this cartoon-like mayhem, one group of quite serious e-mails caught our attention and seemed to require serious consideration.
Stratfor has been treating both Iraq and the global U.S.-jihadist conflict as a war, understandable by the rules of warfare. We have treated this as an asymmetric war in which two sides, using very different methods, have engaged in a global duel. If this is so, then looking to previous wars will provide us with guidance. As an example, we spoke last week of the current offensive as similar to the Battle of the Bulge and Tet -- one unsuccessful and one successful military gambit to reverse an unacceptable course of events.
A series of thoughtful e-mails arrived, arguing that in thinking in terms of conventional warfare -- and these readers regard even the unconventional warfare of Vietnam as ultimately conventional -- we are fundamentally missing the point about what is happening. The United States may be engaging in warfare, but the jihadists are not. As one writer put it, al Qaeda is engaged in a kind of theater and is indifferent to the outcome in any practical sense. Creating terror is an end in itself. Therefore, so long as it can continue to inflict terror at some level and with some randomness, it will be satisfied.
Put simply, this argument goes, al Qaeda does not think of itself as being in a war but in a permanent confrontation with Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism. This is not warfare properly understood because it is not politics properly understood. Moreover, another stream went, terrorism is not a warfighting strategy but a psychological one. Yet others argued that al Qaeda is not sufficiently coherent as an organization to be engaged in warfighting and that what the United States faces is not a military force but a social movement.
These are good, thoughtful arguments that have some merit. Ultimately, however, we think them to be in error.
Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war is the continuation of politics by other means. In order for the United States to be engaged in a war with al Qaeda, three things seem to be necessary.
1. Al Qaeda must be an entity that is capable of making and enforcing decisions. There can be no war without strategy and tactics, and no strategy and tactics without a command structure.
2. Al Qaeda must have political goals that are in some sense practical. Punishing the infidel is not a political goal: It is not intended to achieve a political outcome, nor is it intended to create or influence regimes.
3. Al Qaeda must have a warfighting strategy that it is pursuing. Its actions must fit into the paradigm of war and make sense from a military standpoint.
In our view, all three of these criteria are met. This does not mean that al Qaeda will or won't be successful; it simply means that al Qaeda's behavior can be properly understood in terms of war.
First, it is true that al Qaeda is not a nation. The history of warfare is replete with sub-national groups that have waged wars on the way to becoming nations or to taking over a state. What is interesting about al Qaeda is that it is not a sub-national grouping but a trans-national grouping. Its goals do not involve any one country, but a range of countries. What comes to mind is the First and Second Communist International, before the Bolshevik Revolution captured revolutionary communism for the Soviet state.
In the end, however, the issue is less whether there is historical precedent for al Qaeda than whether there is a decision-making structure that can guide combatants through the war. There certainly was one on Sept. 11, 2001. At this point, that structure appears to be frayed. But if it is frayed, that is not due to the nature of al Qaeda but rather to the reversals it has suffered. In addition, decision-making must be appropriate to a particular battlefield. Whereas the United States may require a highly technical command, control and communication system to manage its assets on the battlefield, al Qaeda commands sparse forces on a global basis in an intensely hostile environment.
The very process of command, control and communication represents the Achilles' heel of their system. More precisely, the enemy -- the United States -- owns the electromagnetic spectrum. Communications through that domain will lead to detection and destruction. This leaves al Qaeda's primary path of communication as the movement of humans from one point to another to deliver messages. Command and control is dramatically slowed by communications. By necessity, operational and tactical control devolve to forces in the field. The situation on the global battlefield requires that al Qaeda provide only general guidance. That does not prevent the waging of a global offensive, planned in general with sufficient time for couriers to arrive with instructions. Al Qaeda is a warfighting system -- but one that, of necessity, operates by different rules than others. Al Qaeda has a command structure and does wage war.
Al Qaeda also has political goals. Indeed, it differs from prior groups that used terror tactics by the fact that it embarked on the war with political goals. The long-term goal -- creating a caliphate encompassing all the lands it deems to be part of the dominion of Islam -- was not the immediate goal. Rather, al Qaeda's immediate goal was to increase the effective Islamist opposition to existing Muslim regimes to force at least one successful uprising. The means toward that end were two-fold: First, to demonstrate in the Muslim world the vulnerability of the United States -- the patron of many of these existing regimes -- and second, to force a response from the United States that would increase either contempt or effective hostility among Muslims. If the United States refused combat, this would be a sign that it was a paper tiger. If it surged into the Islamic world, this would prove the United States was the enemy. Either way, al Qaeda thought it would win.
This perspective differs wildly from that of terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s. Consider groups such as the Bader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Weather Underground in the United States or even Black September. The first two couldn't state a coherent political program, let alone correlate their actions with that program. Black September had a goal -- the creation of a Palestinian state -- but there was no clear connection between any of its actions and that goal. Killing Israeli athletes in Munich was theater.
Al Qaeda had a very clear goal and, from many perspectives, it was not a preposterous goal. It wanted governments like that in Egypt to fall in an Islamist uprising. It felt that the submerged sentiment in these countries favored Islamism, and that -- depending on the behavior of the United States -- risings were achievable. Al Qaeda might have been wrong, and an element of psychological warfare was present, but in the end, the attacks on Sept. 11 and afterward were carefully connected with a political goal.
If they made an error, it was only in assuming that genuine anti-Americanism and hatred of local regimes supported by the United States would translate into effective anti-Americanism that could be leveraged to al Qaeda's advantage. Public sentiment matters in democratic regimes; it doesn't matter in warfare very much. Consider: Most of Europe hated the Germans and their occupation during World War II. Anti-German feeling was overwhelming. Nevertheless, this did not translate into effective anti-German sentiment. European states were never in a position to overthrow German power. That required an external intervention. In Vietnam, on the other hand, anti-Americanism proved effective: It turned into a warfighting process.
Where al Qaeda miscalculated was in assuming that sentiment would turn into effective sentiment. Thus far, except in four Sunni provinces in Iraq, that hasn't happened. But that it didn't happen was neither pre-ordained nor obvious. Al Qaeda knew what it was doing.
Finally, al Qaeda used a reasonable method of warfighting to achieve its aims. Given its intention -- to strike the United States and other countries -- and its resources, its only option was to conduct counterpopulation operations. Allied bombing of Germany and Japan and the German bombing of London constituted counterpopulation attacks. The goal was to drive a wedge between the state and population, or cause a social breakdown, through mass bombings designed to inflict hardship and generate terror among the civilian populace.
Al Qaeda's use of terror attacks suited its strategic goals. The organization intended to destabilize the target country, forcing it into military actions that would bring the desirable result. Given al Qaeda's resources and expertise in covert operations, it had few options other than pursuing terror attacks.
At this point, al Qaeda is losing the war from the standpoint of its own strategic goals. No Muslim regime has fallen since Sept. 11, save two -- Afghanistan and Iraq -- that fell to the United States. The Iraqi resistance showed extreme promise for a very long time, given American miscalculations. Anti-Americanism had turned effective. However, the shifting calculus among the Sunni elders has threatened to undermine support for al Qaeda's man in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and the Sunni nationalist insurgency -- onto which al Qaeda has clamped parasitically -- has been in danger of disruption. This, coupled with serious breaches in al Qaeda's global system, forced the group into a desperate counteroffensive.
The counteroffensive could be only loosely organized, given the difficulties in command, control and communication. Moreover, the resources available were local supporters in places such as London who lacked the key skills needed for strategic operations -- operations on the order of Sept. 11. The counteroffensive may not be over, but thus far the attacks appear to be politically ineffective. There has been no shift in the basic trends. The center of gravity of the situation now is in Iraq, among the Sunnis. As the Sunnis go, so goes the war in Iraq. As the war in Iraq goes, so goes the general war in the Muslim world. The trend favors the United States, but al Qaeda is attempting to reverse that trend.
In short, al Qaeda is very much a warfighting entity. It adheres to the general rules of warfare and therefore can be understood and, to a limited extent, predicted, on the basis of its political program and resources. The outcome of the war is still uncertain, and the level of violence is not a measure of anyone's warfighting capability unless you know their resources. In warfare, the most intense fighting frequently occurs prior to collapse. If the Sunnis in Iraq switch sides -- which is one of the things U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently visited Iraq to try to arrange -- al Qaeda's back will be against the wall. The violence will not end, but its significance will decline.
We therefore feel that we can, in fact, understand the U.S.-al Qaeda war in relatively conventional ways, so long as we adjust for the asymmetric nature of the conflict. In the end, war is simply politics by other means. The United States has its means, and so does al Qaeda. But it is still war.
Taistelutekniikan kehittyminen on normaali ilmiö pitkään jatkuvissa konflikteissa. Pelkän yrityksen ja erehdyksen kautta oppimisen lisäksi, vastapuolella on ollut aikaa seurata, miten jenkit ym toimivat. Lisäksi tietoa taistelutekniikasta löytyy vaikka kuinka paljon ihan avoimista lähteistä. Motivaatiota opetella uutta ja harjoitella lienee lisännyt toistuva turpaan ottaminen ja epäonnistuminen tai sen vierestä katsominen.
Ehkä ei suoraan liity aiheeseen mutta varoituksen sana on paikallaan:
Älä ole pullukka tai ainakaan näytä pullukalta.
Älä hikoile missään tilanteessa.
Älä hermostu jos myöhästyt bussista.
Ole sosiaalinen, katso silmiin ja hymyile vaikka oletkin joutunut heräämään aikaisin aamulla.
Hanki kantaja, joka huolehtii selkärepustasi tai muista kantamuksistasi.
Etenkin naisilla on vähäpukeisuus toivottavaa.
:lol: :lol:
Vi***taisi tulla ammutuksi päähän vain siksi, että kiiruhtaa salilta hikisenä ja reppu selässä kotiin.
Vastaus yllä olevaan:
Kansainvälinen poliisipäällikköjä edustava järjestö katsoo, että poliisien on käytettävä rohkeammin tappavaa voimaa terroriteoista epäiltyjä vastaan. Järjestön mukaan on täysin oikeutettua, että itsemurhapommittajaksi epäiltyä ammutaan päähän, kirjoittaa Washington Post -lehti.
Yhdysvalloissa päämajaansa pitävä International Association of Chiefs of Police - poliisipäällikköjen kansainvälinen järjestö - antoi uudet ohjeensa 20 000 jäsenelleen pari viikkoa ennen kuin Britannian poliisi ampui brasilialaisen sähkömiehen kuoliaaksi Lontoon metrossa epäiltyään tämän yrittävän itsemurhaiskua.
Aiemmin amerikkalaispoliiseilla on ollut lupa ampua tappaakseen vain, jos ihmishenkiä on välittömässä vaarassa. Washington Postin mukaan järjestö uusi ohjeitaan heti Lontoon ensimmäisten pommi-iskujen jälkeen. Liikennevälineissä tehdyissä iskuissa kuoli ainakin 56 ihmistä ja satoja haavoittui.
Runsas hikoilu tai hermoilu riittää
Lehden mukaan järjestö ohjeistaa poliiseja tunnistamaan itsemurhaiskua suunnittelevat näiden käytöksen perusteella. Jos kriteerit täyttyvät, ainoa oikea tapa on tähdätä epäiltyä päähän, jottei tämä pysty laukaisemaan päälleen vyöttämiään räjähteitä.
Epäilyä herättävää käytöstä on ohjeiden mukaan liian runsas pukeutuminen lämpimällä säällä, pullistelevan tai johtoja pursuavan selkärepun kantaminen, hermostuneisuus, liiallinen hikoilu tai haluttomuus katsekontaktiin.
Uusien ohjeiden mukaan aseeseen saa tarttua, vaikka vaaratilanne ei olisikaan välittömästi uhkaava. Poliisilla pitää kuitenkin olla "kohtuullinen peruste" uskoa, että epäilty voi räjäyttää pommin.
Lähteet: STT
Toimittaja: Katja Digert, Edilex-toimitus (katja.digert@edita.fi)
Voi olla vaarallista tälläiselle isokokoiselle matkustella bussissa ilman kunnon ilmanvaihtoa, hiki tulee heti pintaan.
Vaatetus on kyllä tuollaisessa tapauksessa vähäinen.... ehkä pelastaa??
Täytyy jatkaa ulkomailla jo hyväksi todettua tapaa vuokrata auto ilmastoinnilla.
Mitenhän se vaikuttaa jos tykkää pukeutua camovärisiin vaatteisiin??
Pelottaa jo pelkkä ajatuskin.
-Sergei-
Huomenta!
Topic is drifting away, but to add some meat to KSa's comment, I would recommend reading this story.
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/08/the_ied_marketp.html
About shooting to head.
1. comment is that this kind of shooting would incapacitate the target. At lleast reading different publications, you need to destroy certain part of target's brain to incapacitate object instantly. If you miss it, body would live some more second while it is able to trigger bomb (preconditions is that target is holding the trigger).
2. comment is that some publications suggest in crowded palces (in the streets, underground etc) to shoot targets form down to up and up to down to limit collateral damage. For example you kneel and shoot to head, so bullet flies to the air, not towards bystanders.
It's just theory, bla-bla-bla
:roll:
Näin myös Irakissa:
Elusive sniper saps US morale in Baghdad
Commanders weigh their options as 'Juba' notches up more kills
Rory Carroll in Baghdad
Friday August 5, 2005
The Guardian
They have never seen Juba. They hear him, but by then it's too late: a shot rings out and another US soldier slumps dead or wounded.
There is never a follow-up shot, never a chance for US forces to identify the origin, to make the hunter the hunted. He fires once and vanishes...
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1542824,00.html
I have heard somewhere that for incapacitate a person, you have to shoot in the triangle what comes at both eyes and tip of the nose.
So it's basicly damn small area. :roll:
Sad story.
//http://www.snipercountry.com/Articles/SIA_RooftopExecution.asp
This story is mentioned also in this photo serie.
//http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/20061102_MEDIC_FEATURE/blocker.html